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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
THE POSITIVIST FOUNDATIONS OF ORIGINALISM:
AN ACCOUNT AND CRITIQUE
JAMES A. GARDNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For at least a decade, one of the most vital debates in constitutional law
has focused on two related questions: the extent to which the Consti-
tution has a fixed or determinate meaning accessible to current interpreters;
and the extent to which constitutional judicial decisions can or should
rely for guidance upon sources outside the constitutional text and relevant
founding history. This debate, which has at times involved scholars,'
judges,2 the Justice Department,3 the Senate,4 and even the general pub-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A.
1980, Yale University; J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. This article has benefitted from
the helpful suggestions and comments of Don Korobkin, Jay Mootz, and Dennis
Patterson. Western New England College School of Law and Dean Howard Kalodner
provided financial support.
1 To call the scholarly literature on this topic voluminous would be seriously to
understate its bulk. Some flavor for the debate might be obtained by comparing The
Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law and Public Policy: The Crisis in Legal
Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurisprudence, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 281 (1988)
[hereinafter Federalist Symposium ], with Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985). For a useful introduction to the debate over originalism as a theory of
constitutional interpretation see Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
2 E.g., Brennan, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985)
(discussing constitutional interpretation generally and arguing that the meaning of the
text must change with the times); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
TEX. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (1976) (discussing the non-majoritarian aspects of the judiciary
and arguing that the legislature is the proper forum for constitutional change); Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989) (arguing that although
originalism is not without its problems, it is preferable to nonoriginalism).
I Edwin Meese, United States Attorney General from 1984 to 1988, was particularly
active in promoting his views on constitutional interpretation. See Meese, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988) [hereinafter
Meese, Jurisprudence]; Meese, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22,
24 (1985) [hereinafter Meese, Construing] ("The presumption of a written document is
that it conveys meaning.").
I Constitutional interpretation became a focal point in the hearings over the
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lic,5 has produced a wide variety of views. At one end of the spectrum are
those who view the constitutional text or the intent of the framers as not
only determinate and knowable, but as the only legitimate source of author-
ity for constitutional decisionmaking.6 At the other extreme lie those who
view the text as radically indeterminate and the interpretational enterprise as
virtually open-ended.7
Much of the vigor of the debate has been generated by influential advo-
confirmation of Robert Bork for a seat on the United States Supreme Court. See gener-
ally Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice, Supreme Court: Hearings
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Nomina-
tion of Bork].
I During the proceedings on Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court the
issue was sufficiently in the public mind to prompt the Gallup organization to take a poll
asking respondents whether judges should decide cases by reference to the intentions of
the framers alone, or whether they should also consult their own values. Fifty-two
percent of those polled said that judges should follow the original intentions of the
framers, and 40% said judges could also consult their own values. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82
Nw. U.L. REV. 226, 227 n.5 (1988) (citing A Newsweek Poll Bork the Court and the
Issues, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1987, at 26).
6 See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 193 (1986) (stating that "all power must be
drawn from the Constitution"); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY (1977)
(arguing that the role of the Court is to police the boundaries drawn in the Constitution);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971)
("Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the Court."); Meese,
Jurisprudence, supra note 3; Scalia, supra note 2, at 854 ("The principal theoretical defect
of nonoriginalism... is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial
review of constitutionality.").
I See, e.g., J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982) (stating that "[tihere are as many plausible
readings of the Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet"); Tushnet, Following the
Rule Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV.
781, 784-85 (1983).
There is, of course, an enormous and varied middle ground. Some of its occupants
include: Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (stating that
interpretation is "neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity");
Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intentions, 100 HARV. L. REV.
751 (1987) (advocating a moderate approach to interpretation that maintains respect for
the rule of law); Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773
(arguing that originalism is a plausible approach to constitutional adjudication); Perry,
The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985) (explaining that judges should consult
both tradition and reason when interpreting the Constitution); Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1068 (1981) ("Constitutional law... emerges not
as exegesis, but as a process by which each generation gives formal expression to the
values it holds fundamental .... "); Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29
UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982) (stating that judges should explore the meaning of
constitutional language before venturing outside the text).
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cates marching under the banner of originalism. Although the originalist
position itself covers a variety of views, the core tenet of originalism, as I
shall use the term here, holds that the principal task of judges called upon to
interpret the Constitution is to ascertain and give effect to the original inten-
tions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution.' Originalists support
their position, as of course they must, by arguing that we can reliably dis-
cover the intentions of the framers and faithfully apply them to most con-
temporary problems.9
Critics of originalism, both on and off the bench, have responded almost
universally by attacking its premises. They have argued, for example, that it
is unclear whom we ought to count as a framer or ratifier whose intent is
relevant;'0 that a large group of individuals cannot possess a meaningful col-
lective intent suitable for application to interpretational problems;1 ' that
I See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. This version of originalism is
sometimes known as "intentionalism." There is another, more extreme, form of
originalism, sometimes known as "textualism," which holds that the constitutional text
itself is a sufficient source for judicial interpreters. Textualism is far less defensible than
intentionalism and consequently has few enough adherents to justify ignoring it for
purposes of this Article. For general discussions of textualism and its relation to
intentionalism, see, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REv. 204, 205-17 (1980) (examining the method and rationale of textualism);
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Kay, supra note 5, at
229-35; Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 683, 684 (1985) (arguing that textualism suffers from the same flaws as do
originalism and interpretivism).
The distinction between textualism and intentionalism has important analogues in the
area of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21-22 (1988); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic] (exploring the thesis that
courts should interpret statutes dynamically); Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Textualism ] (stating that textualism posits that
once a court has determined the plain meaning of a statute, legislative history becomes
irrelevant).
I See, e.g., Meese, Construing, supra note 3, at 23-24; Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 377 (1981).
10 E.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 318-20 (1986).
"1 See, e.g., Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456
(1984) (noting the problem of determining group intention in legislative bodies); Brest,
supra note 8, at 214-15 (discussing the problems involved in finding a meaningful
collective intent suitable for application to constitutional interpretation); Munzer &
Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029,
1032 (1977) (noting that "it is especially difficult to identify the intentions of a large
group such as the authors of the Constitution"); Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L.
REV. 659, 663-64 (1987) (arguing that originalism fails to address adequately the problem
of group intent); see also Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48
(1983) (stating that legislatures do not have intentions; rather, legislative process has only
outcomes); Eskridge, Textualism, supra note 8, at 642.
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such an intent is, in any event, impossible to ascertain reliably;12 and, most
significantly, that the process of textual interpretation itself, particularly
where the text is old, simply cannot occur in the value-neutral way that
originalists suppose. 3
My project here is somewhat different. Rather than criticize originalism
by attacking its assumptions, I propose to grant its premises. Thus, I shall
assume throughout my analysis that a meaningful reconstruction of the his-
torical intentions of the founders is both possible and useful, in just the ways
that originalists suppose. I shall show, however, that even when we grant
most of originalism's fundamental assumptions, its chief claim-that judges
may never legitimately update the Constitution to conform to current
norms--does not follow from its premises. I shall argue that this rule of
originalist interpretation is not, as originalists sometimes suggest, a formal
requirement of originalist political theory, but rather a pragmatic eviden-
tiary rule. Like the Statute of Frauds, this rule simply expresses a preference
for a writing in constitutional adjudication.
Before turning to this analysis, however, I want to explain why it is impor-
tant to undertake it in the first place. If originalism's assumptions are inco-
herent, as some have argued, what is the point of demonstrating that it also
fails on its own terms? There are several reasons for mounting such a cri-
tique. First, despite often powerful and persuasive criticisms, the attraction
of originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation persists. The idea
of a unique founding moment, a constitutional "Big Bang" that permanently
fixed the properties of our legal and social universe, exercises a strong hold
on the American imagination.' 4 A widely shared cultural premise of this
sort simply cannot be ignored even when it is thought to be inappropriate.
Second, our courts, for better or for worse, continue to speak the language
of originalism-as indeed they have since the founding of the republic. The
Supreme Court routinely consults the intent of the founders in its constitu-
tional decisions,'" just as it routinely declares its unwillingness or lack of
12 Brest, supra note 8, at 221-22; Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1017 (1981) (criticizing historicism as inaccurate); Munzer & Nickel, supra note 11,
at 1032; Powell, supra note 11, at 673-74; Sandalow, supra note 7, at 1035-36.
13 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 318-20 (viewing textual interpretation as a
normative process); Brennan, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that "[w]e current Justices read
the Constitution in the only way we can: as Twentieth Century Americans"); Levinson,
supra note 7, at 377-396; Tushnet, supra note 7, at 784-85.
14 See, e.g., M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF (1986)
(describing the place of the Constitution in the public consciousness and symbolic life of
the American people); Perry, supra note 7, at 592; Grey, supra note 8.
15 From the most recent Term, see, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2719-
20 (1990) (discussing the original understanding of the ex post facto clause); OPM v.
Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465, 2473 (1990) (discussing the framers' intent for the
appropriations clause of the Constitution); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct.
1964, 1970-71 (1990) (consulting the framers' intent for the origination clause); see also
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authority to substitute its judgment for that of the founders.'6 Any lawyer
knows that he or she cannot respond in court to an argument based on the
original understanding of the Constitution by claiming that the concept of
original intent is incoherent. The only effective response is to offer an alter-
native and more persuasive vision of the original understanding; the use of
originalist vocabulary is simply obligatory for participants in the legal
system.
Third, the presence on the Supreme Court of two of the nation's leading
proponents of originalism, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate
Justice Antonin Scalia-to say nothing of the dozens of like-minded lower
court judges appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush-seems to guarantee
that originalism will be a prominent and unavoidable part of the constitu-
tional landscape for some time. It is thus worth taking seriously. 7
Finally, criticizing originalism on its own terms may provide at least a
limited alternative to the disturbing uncertainty often left in the wake of
hermeneutic critiques of originalist interpretation. Critics from this perspec-
tive typically argue that texts lack any fixed, objective meaning, and that
judges, far from recovering the meaning of the Constitution, in essence cre-
ate it each time they seek to interpret the text.'" This approach can easily
Monagahan, supra note 9, at 375 ("[j]udicial opinions at least purport to take originalism
seriously").
16 Justice Harlan, dissenting in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), expressed one
of the most complete statements of this view:
[W]hen the Court gives the language of the Constitution an unforeseen application,
it does so, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose
of the Framers. This is necessarily so; the federal judiciary, which by express
constitutional provision is appointed for life, and therefore cannot be held
responsible by the electorate, has no inherent general authority to establish the
norms for the rest of society. It is limited to elaboration and application of the
precepts ordained in the Constitution by the political representatives of the people.
When the court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it
has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was
committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest
duty to protect.
[Thus,] the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for the
commands of the Constitution ....,
Id. at 202-04 (footnotes omitted). Accord Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966). See also Bork, supra note 6, at 3-4 ("The Supreme Court regularly
insists that its results ... do not spring from the mere will of the Justices in the majority
but are supported, indeed compelled, by ... the Constitution. Value choices are attrib-
uted to the Founding Fathers, not to the Court.").
17 There can be little doubt that interest in originalism has increased markedly in
recent years. See, e.g., Federalist Symposium, supra note 1; Symposium: The First Annual
Federalist Society Lawyers Convention-1987, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1988).
18 See generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTICS READER
(S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988).
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
slide into a sort of moral relativism, or even nihilism.'9 A critique of
originalism that does not also challenge the foundations of so many other
important contemporary beliefs about the world may thus hold some appeal.
In order to conduct such a critique, it is first necessary to give an account
of originalism that takes it seriously at a theoretical level. Accordingly, in
Part II of this Article I set out the political theory upon which originalism
rests. Specifically, I argue that originalism can best be understood as a
familiar form of consent-based positivism.2" Further, this political theory
provides originalism with a coherent account of the intergenerational
authority of the framers, something it is often accused of lacking. In Part
III, I set out this account.
In Part IV, I examine originalism's prophylactic rule against judicial
updating of the Constitution in light of originalism's theoretical premises. I
argue that this rule at bottom does no more than express a preference for a
writing in constitutional adjudication. Finally, in Part V, I conclude that
originalists have exaggerated the benefits of the strict prohibition on judicial
updating, and that a more flexible approach could accomplish the goals of
originalism better than the rigid rule now in use.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF ORIGINALISM
A. A Basic Outline of Originalist Claims
To discuss originalism meaningfully, we must begin with a description of
its claims. This is easier said than done. Originalism embraces a range of
views, and originalists do not always agree among themselves about the con-
tent of the doctrine. Nonetheless, I think any fair description of originalism
would include the following six premises.
First, the Constitution embodies the authoritative choices that the people
of the United States have made about the ways in which their society and
government are to be structured.2 ' Second, these authoritative choices were
made at the time of the framing and ratification of the Constitution and its
amendments.22 Third, the choices so made were intended to be, and are
permanent, until altered by the people themselves through the constitutional
19 See Fiss, supra note 7, at 740-41; Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a
Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671, 674-82 (1984).
20 The word "positivism" has unfortunately taken on a number of different meanings.
See, e.g., Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 975-76 (1981). I use
the term here to describe the political view that a constitution is authoritative because it
embodies the command of the sovereign people. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying
text.
21 See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 6, at 66; R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 281.
22 See, e.g., Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 350, 350-51 (1988); Meese, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 9; Scalia, supra note 2,
at 862-63.
[Vol. 7 1:1
1991] POSITIVIST FOUNDATIONS OF ORIGINALISM 7
process of amendment.2" Fourth, the content of these choices, and conse-
quently the meaning of the Constitution, is largely determinate and generally
knowable through examination of the constitutional text and by appropriate
historical research into the intentions of the Constitution's framers and
ratifiers (I shall call these individuals collectively, "the founders").' Fifth,
the role of judges in constitutional cases is simply and exclusively to discover
and give effect to the meaning of the Constitution as embodied in the consti-
tutional text and the original intentions of the founders.2" Sixth, any judicial
decision that deviates from the original meaning of the Constitution, at least
in the absence of a constitutional amendment authorizing such a deviation,
is an illegitimate substitution of the value judgments of the court for those of
the people.2 6
B. Originalism as Consent-Based Positivism
Perhaps because they are often cast in the role of critics, originalists often
seem to be less concerned with displaying the coherence and positive attrib-
utes of their" own political theory than with exposing the inadequacies and
inconsistencies of their opponents' positions. Nevertheless, it is not difficult
to uncover among originalist writings what amounts to a foundational
originalist political theory. For the originalist, ultimate authority in our
society is lodged in the people.2 The Constitution is the vehicle by which
the people consent to the creation of a government and spell out its various
powers and the limitations on those powers.' The Constitution thus creates
23 See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 6, at 66; Maltz, supra note 7,
at 801-02; Monaghan, supra note 9, at 366 ("Our legal griindnorm has been that the body
politic can at a specific time definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering is
binding on all organs of government until changed by amendment.").
24 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 363-64;
Meese, Construing, supra note 3, at 23-24; Meese, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 5-6;
Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 696-97; Scalia, supra note 2, at 854.
25 See, e.g., Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent of
the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811, 811-12 (1983); Meese,
Construing, supra note 3, at 26.
26 See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 6, at 66; R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 263-64; Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial
Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87, 87 (1981) ("activist judicial review is inconsistent with
democratic theory because it substitutes the policy choices of unleashed, unaccountable
judges for those of the people's representatives"); Bork, supra note 6, at 3, 6; Rehnquist,
supra note 2, at 695.
21 Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 696 ("The people are the ultimate source of authority
2 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 295 (arguing
that the founders did not create the Constitution as a" 'symbol' of continuity and unity,"
but as a means of creating a government by the people's consent); Bork, supra note 6, at
3; Meese, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 8, 9 (describing the Constitution as an
innovation because it is written, and so formally expresses the consent of the people).
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a government whose officials are "the servants of the people."' Precisely
because they are servants whose power to bind the people is confined to
"laws which are made pursuant to and in accord with the Constitution's
command,, 30 government officials such as judges are powerless to deviate
from the terms of "popular consent"31 expressed in the Constitution. Any
such deviations, even if benignly motivated, are "usurpations" by the agents
of the sovereign people.32
This familiar version of constitutional authority is part of a more compre-
hensive theory of consent-based positivism which I have referred to else-
where as the "Lockean theory of popular sovereignty."' It is a political
theory of rightful governance that is allied with, though not necessarily
derived from, John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, and which is
spelled out with greater or lesser degrees of specificity in the Declaration of
Independence,' the Constitution,' writings of the founders,' and the early
decisions of the Supreme Court.37
A somewhat more complete, though still quite abbreviated account of this
theory, would go something like the following. Civil society arises from the
state of nature when autonomous individuals, self-ruling as a matter of natu-
ral law, agree voluntarily for their own mutual security and advantage to
band together into a society.m A central feature of this transaction is the
29 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 316.
:o Meese, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 8.
31 Bork, supra note 6, at 2.
32 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 250; see also G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 (10th ed. 1980) (remarks of Senator Jesse Helms
defending bill that would limit Supreme Court jurisdiction as a means of preventing
"judicial usurpations").
31 Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty
Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189 (1990).
1 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed").
35 E.g., U.S. CONST., preamble; art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1; art. VI; art. VII;
amend. IX.
36 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72 (A. Hamilton), No. 37, at 227 (J.
Madison), No. 51 at 324-25 (A. Hamilton), No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
37 E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 315, 404-05 (1819) ("The
government of the Union... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In
form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them .
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 448 (1793) ("a State derives its authority from
... the voluntary and deliberate choice of the people"). For a fuller discussion of these
and other sources, see Gardner, supra note 33, at 206-11.
38 See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 4, at 4, § 87, at 48-49,
§ 89, at 49-50 (T. Peardon, ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1st ed. 1690). Locke's theory is
generally quite consistent in its fundamentals with the ideas of many other influential
political philosophers of the Enlightenment, including Thomas Hobbes, Francis
[Vol. 71:1
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surrender by each member of the society of his or her natural right of self-
rule to the collective society. This exchange usually, although not always,
takes the form of a binding agreement to abide by the will of the majority of
the society's members.
3 9
Having entered into a self-governing society, society's members generally
find it advantageous to create a government to handle the chores associated
with collective self-rule. The government, on this model, is thus no more
than an agent of the people, and can exercise only the powers the people
have delegated, and then only in a way that the people have authorized.' A
government that the people have duly appointed and that acts within the
bounds of its delegated powers is "legitimate"-that is, it has the right, and
not merely the power, to make laws binding on society. Conversely, a gov-
ernment that the people have not appointed, or that exceeds the scope of its
delegated powers-one that exists or acts without the consent of the gov-
erned-is not legitimate. It and its members are "usurpers" and its laws
void.41 The people have the right to resist the usurping government and to
replace it with one of their choice.
42
By invoking this familiar model of constitutional authority, originalists
cast themselves as heirs to what has been the dominant American political
theory since the founding,43 a theory that Eugene Rostow once called "the
prevailing political theory of modern times and the only modern rival for the
doctrine that power proceeds from the barrel of a gun." 44 This notion of
popular sovereignty is a prototypically and traditionally American way of
thinking about government and society, a factor which undoubtedly plays no
small part in originalism's persistence and appeal, even in the face of strong
criticism.
C. The Problem Defined: Judicial Updating of the Constitution
In this section, I shall focus on a single type of interpretational problem--
the judicial technique of "updating" the Constitution. Originalists accuse a
court of updating the Constitution when, rather than applying a constitu-
Hutcheson, Algernon Sidney, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Hugo Grotius, Samuel
Pufendorf and William Blackstone. See Gardner, supra note 33, at nn.47-53.
I J. LOCKE, supra note 38, § 87, at 48-49, § 89, at 49-50, §§ 95-99, at 54-56.
40 Id. §§ 134-42, at 75-82.
41 Id. §§ 197-98, at 110-11.
42 Id., § 243, at 139.
43 See, e.g., H. BERAN, THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 1 (1987)
(stating that consent theory is the "most commonly accepted theory of political
obligation in the history of Western political philosophy"); Brest, supra note 8, at 225
(consent theory is "the political theory most deeply rooted in the American tradition");
Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791, 791
(1984) (consent theory is "widely and uncritically accepted today").
'4 Rostow, The Rightful Limits of Freedom in a Liberal Democratic State.: Of Civil
Disobedience, in Is LAW DEAD? 39 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
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tional provision according to its established meaning, the court reinterprets
words in the Constitution to conform to current attitudes and values.45
Originalists of all stripes condemn such updating, and I shall refer to this
condemnation as the "anti-updating rule."
For purposes of the following discussion, the eighth amendment ban on
"cruel and unusual punishment" serves as a good example of judicial updat-
ing.' This provision allows us to avoid much of the political and ideological
baggage associated with the constitutional phrases "due process" and "equal
protection," which are at present the main battlegrounds of the conflict
between originalists and nonoriginalists.47 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has been unusually forthright in announcing its intention to engage in self-
conscious judicial updating of the eighth amendment. In language that must
make an originalist's skin crawl, the Court has said: "the words of the
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is not static. The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society. '
In the consent-based account of originalism that follows, I shall rely for
illustrative purposes on the following constitutional question: Does the
eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibit a federal
law imposing flogging as a criminal punishment?49 There is fairly good evi-
dence to suggest that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution would not
have viewed flogging, at least for some crimes, as cruel or unusual. For
example, the nation's first criminal law, enacted by the first Congress in
46 See, e.g., Miller, Pretense and Our Two Constitutions, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 375,
380 (1986); Monaghan, Comment on Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, 72 IOWA L. REV.
1309, 1309 (1987) ("the judicial function is to apply 'this Constitution,' not to revise or
update it"). In the terminology of interpretation, the word "updating" is used more
widely to refer to judicial interpretations of statutes than of constitutions. See, e.g.,
Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 20. The idea, however, is also common in originalist writings.
See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 2 ("the Court was
not designed to act ... as a 'continuing constitutional convention' ").
4' U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
41 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 6 (equal
protection); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (equal protection and due
process, among others); Bork, supra note 6, at 11-12 (due process and equal protection);
M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) (equal
protection, due process). Another important battleground is the ninth amendment and
the extent to which it can be viewed as the source of unenumerated rights. See generally
Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing for
protection of unenumerated rights); Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64
CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 37 (1988).
48 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
49 For an argument from the originalist perspective that the Court may not abolish the
death penalty under the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause, see
R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 6.
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1790, made public whipping a punishment for larceny.' But, as it is not my
purpose to argue the point, I shall simply assume for purposes of discussion
that the founders understood a federal law imposing flogging to be constitu-
tionally acceptable. Likewise, there is good evidence that contemporary atti-
tudes consider flogging cruel and unusual. Some courts, for example, have
struck down flogging and paddling of incarcerated individuals under the
eighth amendment;5 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, hardly in
the vanguard of changing social trends, has for many years prohibited flog-
ging as cruel and unusual punishment.5 2 Indeed, Justice Scalia, a prominent
champion of originalism, has stated: "I cannot imagine myself ... uphold-
ing a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging."'" Again, in order to
frame the problem, I shall simply assume that contemporary society consid-
ers flogging cruel and unusual punishment.
If a case arose asking whether a federal criminal law calling for flogging
violated the eighth amendment, originalists, pointing to the framers' intent,
would argue that the law must be upheld. The nonoriginalist, on the other
hand, would ask why this must be so given that we now understand flogging
to be cruel. Before addressing this important question from the point of
view of originalist political theory, it may be illuminating to consider further
the precise nature of originalist claims. The following hypothetical scenarios
will illustrate my point.
Suppose several individuals constitute themselves as a society and estab-
lish a constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. They agree
that their constitution does not proscribe flogging as a cruel and unusual
punishment, and the historical record clearly supports this understanding.
The members of this society then have children who grow up and become
full members of the society. The children, however, grow up in a different
social environment than their parents and come to view flogging as in fact
cruel. When the parents' generation has died off, the members of this society
unanimously view flogging as a cruel punishment. According to originalism,
although the children take a different view than their parents did of the
meaning of the word "cruel" as applied to flogging, courts must nevertheless
o Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 112, 116 (1790); see also Radin, The
Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1031 (1978) (stating that whipping was "thought
perfectly proper" in 1789).
51 See, e.g., Nelson v. Hyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that corporal
punishment in a juvenile detention home was cruel and unusual punishment); Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that the use of a strap in a penitentiary
violated the eighth amendment). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(holding that nonabusive paddling of school children is not prohibited by the eighth
amendment).
52 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (1956) ("Punishment by flogging
... may not be adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon any person subject to this
chapter.").
53 Scalia, supra note 2, at 864.
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adhere to the understanding of the parents and uphold laws that establish
flogging as a criminal penalty.
Now consider a variation on this hypothetical. Suppose the states succeed
in calling a constitutional convention, with instructions to the delegates to
reconsider the entire document-the convention is to have free rein to create
a new government appropriate for our times. Incredibly, after full consider-
ation, the convention decides that the words of the old document in fact
perfectly express what the conventioneers want the new constitution to
express. Consequently, a somewhat embarrassed convention presents a new
constitution for popular approval which is word for word the same as the old
one. This new constitution is then ratified by state ratifying conventions.
I assume that even the most fervid originalist would agree that the words in
this "new" constitution must be given the meaning that we attach to them
today.' Thus, there could be no doubt that the new equal protection clause
prohibits racially segregated schools because that is how we, the framers and
ratifiers of the new constitution, now understand the term. Likewise, there
could be no doubt that the new Bill of Rights applies to the states through
the new fourteenth amendment; that the new due process clauses prohibit
bans on the use of contraceptives by married couples; and that, to return to
the example outlined in the last section, the new eighth amendment prohibits
flogging. To the originalist, this constitution is a new and distinct document,
even though absolutely no indication of its novelty appears on the face of the
document itself.
Why does originalism require different results in these two cases? One
possible explanation-the one most often identified and attacked by original-
ism's critics-is that originalism attributes to a society's founders some sort
of permanent, absolute authority over the terms on which the society shall
exist,55 and that society must in essence refound itself in order to escape this
ancestral power.' This argument is a strawman. In fact, as I shall demon-
strate in the next Part, originalism's underlying positivism provides a ready
I See Berger, supra note 22, at 353 ("were we to write a new constitution, we could
use words according to our present meaning"); R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra
note 6, at 11 ("contemporaneous constructions carry great weight").
51 See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 10-11
(1989) [hereinafter D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS]; D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 38 (1986) [hereinafter D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION] (stating the
view that any judicial deviation from the founders' application of constitutional language
is fundamentally illegitimate); Brest, supra note 8, at 204; Levinson, supra note 7, at 379;
Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justfied?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1985) [hereinafter Simon, Authority of the
Framers]; Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 611 (1985) [hereinafter
Simon, Preface]; see also Farber, supra note 1, at 1099-1100.
56 Of course an amendment would also be sufficient to escape a particular, focused
aspect of the founders' influence. In this context, the amendment would be a sort of
single-issue refounding.
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explanation for the authority of the original understanding, in a way that
does not rely on any sort of Burkean or mystical authority of society's
founders.
A second possible explanation for originalism's differing treatment of the
two hypotheticals is that originalism is less a controversial theory of political
authority than it is a rule of evidence derived from a familiar political the-
ory. On this view, originalism, much like the Statute of Frauds, states a
requirement that the people's wishes, to be enforceable, must be in writing-
that is, in the form of a constitution or constitutional amendment. I shall
argue in Part IV that this is in fact the better view of originalism.
Before defending that view, however, it is necessary to give an account of
originalism that makes the original understanding authoritative by virtue of
the consent of society's current members rather than its ancestral founders.
III. A POSITIvIsT AccouNT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING
A. The Problem of Intergenerational Authority
The centerpiece of originalist doctrine is the normative claim5 7 that we
should-indeed we must-adhere to the original intentions of the founders.
This claim is problematic for two reasons. First, it is not, as strict original-
ists themselves admit, an accurate description of how the Supreme Court has
in fact adjudicated many constitutional questions, particularly in the last
quarter-century.m In numerous cases the Court has quite plainly rejected
original intent as a sound basis for resolving certain constitutional questions.
57 There is some debate over whether this normative claim is also a conventional
claim. Some have contended that there is no convention in our society governing the
proper interpretation of authoritative legal texts. See, e.g., Munzer & Nickel, supra note
11, at 1053-54; Perry, supra note 7, at 575; Simon, Preface, supra note 55, at 615 n.9. On
this view, the scholarly debate over constitutional interpretation simply manifests the
lack of consensus. Others have argued that interpretational conventions do exist, and
that they are originalist. See Kay, supra note 5, at 227-28. Even critics of originalism,
however, have at times suggested that there are at least some cases in which the text is
sufficiently clear, or the historical consensus so complete, or the community of
understanding sufficiently stable over time, to allow originalist methods to produce good
answers to constitutional questions. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 7, at 743; Perry, supra note
7, at 567-69.
Moreover, many advocates of nonoriginalist interpretive strategies nevertheless view
originalism's exacting scrutiny of the constitutional text and the circumstances of the
founding as a highly relevant and necessary, although not often dispositive, aspect of
constitutional decisionmaking. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 10; D. RICHARDS,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 55; Brest, supra note 8, at 228; Sandalow, supra note 7, at
1034.
1 See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 18; Bork,
supra note 6, at 7-10 (criticizing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
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For example, in a celebrated passage in Home Building & Loan Association
v. Blaisdell,5' the Court said:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the fram-
ers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed
upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.'
Such decisions, however, do not deeply trouble originalists because they
view these decisions as improper. Far more troubling to originalists is that a
strict adherence to the framers' original understanding would inevitably
yield many constitutional results that would be highly unpalatable to Ameri-
cans today.6 Fidelity to original intent in all particulars would require the
wholesale discarding of numerous constitutional protections of speech and
the press, religion, equal protection, and due process, many of which now
command an overwhelming social consensus.6 2
A significant problem for originalism is thus how to justify the intergener-
ational authority of the founders."3 The problem of intergenerational
authority deals with the question of why, to put it bluntly, we ought to care
what a bunch of dead people thought about how we ought to live our lives
today-the so-called "dead hand" problem." If we assume, for example,
that the original understanding of the equal protection clause would permit
segregated school systems, why should we give effect to that understanding
59 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
60 Id. at 442-43.
61 See Monaghan, supra note 9, at 381-82 (stating that original intent theory requires
rejection of decisions applying the Bill of Rights to the states).
62 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 6, at 11-12; M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 63-64 (1982).
63 See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 55, at 5; Simon, Authority of the
Framers, supra note 55, at 1482 (arguing that "the intent of the framers ... is not an
authoritative source for discovering the Constitution's meaning"); Garet, Comparative
Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 117
(1985) (noting that originalism fails to explain why the original understanding of the
Constitution should be authoritative); cf Monaghan, supra note 9, at 383-84 (stating that
the authority of the founders is an axiomatic first principle of originalism, not requiring
demonstration).
I See, e.g., Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1072-76 (1988); Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1184
(1987); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 787 (explaining that interpretivism relies upon the "dead
hand of the past"); see also D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 55, at 10;
Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1228 (1984) ("to say that
interpretive review is democratic because the people adopted the Constitution is
erroneous, because not a person alive today, and not even most of our ancestors, voted for
it").
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if, as nearly everyone now agrees, a society with integrated schools is better
and more just than one with segregated schools? It is in answering questions
like these, and in providing a justification for the founders' intergenerational
authority, that originalism has been least satisfying and its advocates least
persuasive.' But, because originalism grounds itself in consent-based polit-
ical theory, it is especially important for originalists to articulate some mean-
ingful basis for binding current generations to original understandings of the
Constitution.
Originalism's underlying political theory of consent-based positivism rests
the legitimacy of government on the consent of the governed. According to
this theory, it is the individual's voluntary decision to join society and soci-
ety's communal decision to create and then submit to governmental rule that
gives rise to the government's right to demand obedience." But consent of
the governed means exactly what it says: those who live under the govern-
ment must consent to its rule. The requirement of consent would be entirely
undermined if an individual's obligation to obey a government could be cre-
ated by the consent of someone else-here, the consent of the founders.67
Indeed, Locke would have described such an arrangement as political slav-
ery.' Thus, political legitimacy on this theory must depend on the consent
of the living members of society to the rule of the current government.69
Whatever legitimacy the consent of the founding generation may have con-
ferred on the government of its time is irrelevant to the legitimacy of the
government we have now. The legitimacy of our government depends upon
current consent.
This facet of originalist political theory poses an initial obstacle to
originalist interpretive practice because it suggests precisely the opposite of
what originalists claim. The requirement of current consent suggests that
the terms of some prior consent, far from being controlling, ought to be
inconsequential. The task for any account of originalism is thus to explain
how we can properly substitute the consent given by the founding generation
for current popular consent, the only legitimate source of governmental
authority.
To accomplish this task consistently with the political assumptions on
which originalism rests, the terms of the original consent, authoritative at
65 For a discussion (and rejection) of several possible justifications for the authority of
the founders, see Simon, Authority of the Framers, supra note 55.
66 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
67 See J. LOCKE, supra note 38, §§ 117-19, at 67-68 (government has no power over
the son by virtue of the consent of the father or ancestors); see also H. BERAN, supra note
43, at 34, 45; Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18
GA. L. REV. 727, 736 (1984) ("[a] particular person can be obligated only if he has
undertaken to obey").
I See J. LOCKE, supra note 38, §§ 22-24, at 15-16, §§ 169-243, at 99-139.
69 See H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 38 ("consent must . . . be that of the present
citizens of the state").
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the time of the founding, must be somehow "carried forward" to allow us to
say that the current generation has consented, either expressly or implic-
itly,7" to those same terms. Only then will the terms of the original consent
have the current authoritativeness that originalists claim. To see how this
might happen, we must examine in some detail the way in which subsequent
generations become members of an established society.
B. The Need for Backward-Looking Consent
Consent-based positivism begins its account of political authority, at least
as it is relevant here, with the establishment of a constitution by the found-
ing members of society. I shall assume, along with originalists, that this
constitution has a discernable meaning based on its text and on the inten-
tions of the founding generation. All but the most extreme nonoriginalists
would probably agree with originalists that over the first few years or per-
haps decades following the founding, the original understanding of the con-
stitution is entitled to considerable weight since it is presumably either
identical to or barely distinguishable from the understanding of those society
members who have bound themselves to obey a government operating under
that constitution." Things get more complicated, however, when with the
passage of time society begins to take on new members.
John Locke, and many of the more theoretically-minded founders, viewed
the entry of new members into society as being based either on actual con-
sent or on some form of tacit consent.72 Such consent could be inferred, for
example, on the basis of voluntary residence in a society's territory, or per-
haps on the basis of acceptance of the benefits of living in the society. Yet,
the concept of tacit consent, and indeed of consent itself, has long been vig-
70 Many versions of consent theory do not require an affirmative act of consent to
establish political authority and obligation; rather, political obligation typically arises in
these theories from a form of tacit consent. For Locke, acts such as continued residence
in a state or use of its roads were sufficient to constitute consent. See J. LOCKE, supra
note 38, § 119, at 68. More recent theories tend to restrict tacit consent to instances
where there is a convention designating certain actions or failures to act as consent
sufficient to give rise to political obligations, and where the putative consenter is aware of
the relevant convention. See, e.g., H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 8-10, 28-29 (arguing that
continued residence in a state constitutes tacit consent only when "there is a generally
known convention that such continued residence counts as tacit consent"); Simmons,
supra note 43, at 802-09 (suggesting that something more than continued residence in a
state is necessary for meaningful consent).
71 See Monaghan, supra note 9, at 375 (stating that "the supreme court in 1800 should
have accorded interpretive primacy to original intent in ascertaining the 'meaning' of the
constitution").
72 See, J. LOCKE, supra note 38, § 119, at 68 ("every man that.., has enjoyment.., of
government does thereby give his tacit consent"); Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS Of JAMES MADISON 18, 24 (C.
Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1981) ("If this assent cannot be given tacitly.., no person
born in Society, could on attaining ripe age, be bound by any Acts of the majority.").
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orously attacked by critics beginning with David Hume.73 These critics
argue that people do not in fact consent to government's rule in any mean-
ingful way, and that the inferences on which tacit consent is based are
unrealistic and arbitrary. 74 In keeping with our practice of granting original-
ist assumptions, let us sidestep these objections for a moment by supposing a
society that inducts new members on the basis of actual consent, under cir-
cumstances in which such consent can be considered meaningful. 75 Assume
that in this society a government official holds a conference with each citi-
zen, whom I shall refer to as the "recruit," just before his or her eighteenth
birthday. At this conference, the recruit's options are reviewed and ques-
tions answered, much as a personnel officer would sit down with a new
employee to help choose a health plan. The question the official would help
the recruit answer is: "Do you wish to become a member of this society?"
The question the recruit would need to answer to make a meaningful choice
is: "What does it mean to be a member of this society?
' 76
73 D. HUME, Of the Original Contract, in MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 359-
60 (H. Aiken ed. 1948).
74 See, e.g., id.; Casinelli, The "Consent" of the Governed, 12 W. POL. Q. 391, 391
(1959) (arguing that both express and tacit consent are fictitious); Dunn, Consent in the
Political Theory of John Locke, in LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON LOCKE'S
POLITICAL IDEAS 129, 138 (G. Schochet ed. 1971); Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 737-38;
Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 59 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 990, 994 (1965) ("consent
theory is much troubled by the difficulty of showing that [we] have in fact consented.
Most of us have not signed any contract with our government"); Sartorius, Political
Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L. REV. 3, 12 (1981) ("[c]onsent... must be
fully voluntary in order to bind"); Simmons, supra note 43, at 805; Smith, Is There a
Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950, 960-61 (1973).
75 Consent is generally understood to require some sort of voluntary act. As a result,
consent is often said to be impossible under circumstances where a free choice is
impossible-for example where individuals face legal, economic or physical obstacles to
free migration among states. See, e.g., H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 31 ("if citizens
remain in a state because those who try to leave are severely penalised or because they
have an unrealistically rosy picture of conditions in their state because of a combination
of censorship and false propaganda by the government, then their acceptance of...
membership in their state does not amount to consent"); D. Hume, supra note 73, at 363
("Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives.., by the small wages
which he acquires?"); Simmons, supra note 43, at 809-18; Simmons, Voluntarism and
Political Associations, 67 VA. L. REV. 19, 28 (1981) ("membership is only voluntary
where nonmembership is a real option").
76 Cf. H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 28 (consent means accepting membership in the
state); see also R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 195-215 (setting forth a theory of
community as a source of political authority and obligation); Honore, Must We Obey?
Necessity as a Ground of Obligation, 67 VA. L. REV. 39, 57 (1981) ("a person who joins in
a game with the consent of the existing players must honor the rules of the game, because
he knows that the other players are not willing to allow him to join unless he is prepared
to do so").
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Consent theory ordinarily contemplates that individuals create legitimate
government in two distinct steps. First, the individual consents to enter into
society on terms mutually acceptable to all other prospective society mem-
bers. Second, after society is constituted on such terms, society members
agree to the creation of a government, although this time on terms agreeable
to a majority77 or, if desired, a supermajority.7 s Whatever the power of this
two-step model to describe the founding of a society and initial establish-
ment of government, it has only limited application to the case of individuals
seeking to enter an established society. Such individuals must essentially
take society as they find it, particularly if the society they seek to enter is a
large one, for two reasons. First, it is virtually impossible in a large society
to consult all other society members concerning the terms of the basic social
contract. Second, even if it were somehow possible to arrange such a consul-
tation, it is highly unlikely that the terms of the agreement would change;
when one or ten or a hundred million people have settled on the conditions
under which society is constituted, the wishes of a single prospective new
member are unlikely to alter the outcome. In other words, it simply is not
possible to reconstitute society each time someone turns eighteen, especially
when thousands of people turn eighteen each day.
Similarly, it is impossible for a large society to debate anew how best to
structure and empower its government each time the society gains a new
member. Nor again is there much likelihood that the addition of a handful of
new members into society could have a substantial influence on the shape of
the existing constitution when the majority of those who already belong to a
large society support it.79
Because of these practical constraints, the question of what it means to
live in a particular society at any given time is likely to be answered much
more by reference to the existing charter of government than to the terms of
the underlying social contract. To a great extent, what it means to be a
member of our society is the same as what it means to live under our Consti-
tution, 0 and that is how the government official would probably respond to
the query of our hypothetical societal recruit. But shifting the frame of ref-
erence from the social contract to the Constitution does not end the matter,
for prospective society members would still want to give their consent intelli-
gently, and to know the terms to which they give their consent.8 ' What does
it mean, they would ask, to live under this Constitution? Or, much the same
thing, what does this Constitution mean?
77 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
78 Ours is of course such a society. See U.S. CONST., art. V (ratification of
amendments).
79 Cf. H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 127.
so See, e.g., id. at 30 (suggesting that "the content of political obligation is... to obey
the constitution, constitutional governments and valid laws").
81 See R. FLATHMAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 220 (1972) (arguing that consent
requires knowledge of what one is consenting to); Simmons, supra note 43, at 802 (same).
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Originalism of course assumes that it is possible to give a fairly decent if
somewhat incomplete answer to these questions. What might, then, be the
reaction of the recruit upon learning about the meaning of the Constitution?
It seems likely that the recruit would find much that is good in the existing
Constitution. It seems equally likely, however, that the recruit would find a
number of features disagreeable. Suppose a recruit from the cohort coming
of age around 1810 asked the following question: "I approve of the provision
barring cruel and unusual punishments. But to my mind, those words
include flogging. Can I join the society with the understanding that flogging
will be considered cruel?" The answer, of course, is no. The rest of society
cannot as a practical matter be summoned from the four corners of the
nation to consider such a change. And if society cannot consider a change,
one certainly cannot be unilaterally imposed. Entry into society entails a
mutual sacrifice of natural rights on equal terms;82 society could neither
cohere nor endure if each member were entitled to enter on whatever terms
he or she chose.
Even though society's recruits do not agree in every particular with the
terms of the existing Constitution, and would have negotiated a slightly or
even very different deal had they been involved at the beginning, they may
still consent to join the society on the existing terms. The requirement of
consent does not mean consent to each and every particular feature, but
rather, as the ratification of our own Constitution shows, to the whole pack-
age, warts and all.' Consent is and must be more like a parliamentary vote
of confidence than a line-item veto.'
It is thus possible to give the type of consent necessary to establish polit-
ical legitimacy to a regime that is not everything one might have hoped. In
fact, the possibility of constitutional amendment in our system makes such a
transaction that much easier since one can enter society after making a per-
sonal compromise and yet retain the opportunity to persuade society to
adjust the Constitution in ways that make it more completely satisfying.
And while this may mean that society will be composed of individuals nearly
all of whom have some bone to pick with the status quo,s5 it will also be a
82 See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
83 See Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979) ("[i]t is the
legitimacy of the political system as a whole that depends on the people's approval, and
that is the source of its democratic character"); see also Carter, Constitutional
Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle,
94 YALE L.J. 821, 838-39 (1985).
81 Arrow's Theorem suggests it is virtually impossible for a pluralist, democratic
society to adopt a coherent constitution if each individual constitutional provision must
command the votes of a majority. Further, the Theorem suggests that it is possible to
have the support of a majority for each provision of a proposed constitution, yet to have
no majority that supports the document taken as a whole. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1963). On this view, a line-item veto
approach to constitutional consent, therefore, would be impracticable.
85 This may indeed have been the case even at the time of the original ratification.
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society composed of individuals who on balance think the Constitution a
comparatively good thing in its present form.
In this way, originalist political theory can explain the process by which
subsequent generations carry forward the original understanding of the Con-
stitution. On this account, the intent of the framers and ratifiers is authori-
tative not because the founding generation possesses some form of Burkean
prescriptive authority, but because the terms of the consent of the governed
as a practical matter are necessarily the same, in the absence of a pertinent
constitutional amendment, as those of the founding generation at all times
after the founding.
IV. ORIGINALISM'S PROPHYLACTIC ANTI-UPDATING RULE
Having provided an account based on originalist political theory of the
intergenerational authority of the founders, we are now in a position to
examine the heart of originalist doctrine, its approach to constitutional inter-
pretation. The essence of originalist interpretation, and the focus of the fol-
lowing discussion, is the anti-updating rule, a prophylactic prohibition
forbidding courts from updating the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion to conform to current norms unless authorized by a pertinent constitu-
tional amendment.s
Many of the state ratifying conventions expressed specific reservations about the
proposed Constitution even as they ratified it. The most common objection was to the
lack of a Bill of Rights. See L. LEVY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 117 (1986) (noting that the "Constitution was ratified only because
"crucial states ... were willing to accept the promise of a bill of rights in the form of
subsequent amendments to the constitution").
11 I want to emphasize here that my discussion will focus exclusively on the problem
of judicial decisions that update the text by giving new meanings to words that actually
appear in the Constitution. I will not consider the broader problem of judicial decisions
that cannot plausibly be grounded in the constitutional text, and which can therefore be
viewed more as judicial "amendments" to the text rather than interpretations of it.
Naturally, where the text contains words of such enormous breadth as "liberty" and
"equal protection of the laws," the distinction between these two categories may prove
illusory. Nevertheless, the distinction is an important one for originalists, who do not
view all aspects of popular consent as politically authoritative, but rather only those
aspects of popular consent that find their way into the constitutional text. Thus, my
argument in the following sections should not be construed to suggest that originalism
offers a political justification for judicial decisions that conform to the terms of popular
consent in lieu of conforming to the constitutional text. Although such a political theory
would be possible-Locke after all wrote to justify the English constitution, which is not
written--contemporary American originalism clearly requires some textual basis for all
legitimate judicial decisions. Thus, judicial responsiveness to social consensus is not
enough for political legitimacy; only social consensus referable to a provision of the
Constitution is a potential source of legitimate decisions. See infra text accompanying
notes 92-99.
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A. The Positivist Framework
According to the consent-based positivist theory on which originalism
rests, the United States Constitution represents a set of instructions from the
sovereign people to their governmental agents.87 The document sets out the
powers that the people have granted to the government, the general purposes
for which they may be used, and a series of limitations on those powers. By
granting to the courts the power of judicial review, the people have given the
courts not only the responsibility for interpreting the people's instructions to
their agents, but also the responsibility for ensuring that the people's other
governmental agents stay within the bounds of their respective authority.8
Thus, on this view, when a court strikes down a congressional enactment,
the court is not exercising its own judgment or engaging in undemocratic
highhandedness,89 but rather concluding that the people's instructions to
Congress forbid Congress from passing that particular law. Indeed, the only
way a court could act undemocratically in this sense would be for it to fail to
observe the wishes of the people by letting stand a law that the people have
instructed the court to condemn, or by striking down a law that the people
have authorized Congress to enact. In such cases, as originalists often point
out, the court would be substituting its own choices for those of the people
and usurping popular authority.
Originalist political theory further states that usurpation by governmental
agents of the authority of their principals, the sovereign people, can deprive
the government of the consent of the governed and thus of political legiti-
macy. The loss of political legitimacy entails the loss of the right to demand
obedience, which in extreme cases could lead not only to widespread disobe-
dience but to ample justification for revolution itself'9 For those who view
the process of judicial review in this way, the stakes are quite high. It is thus
87 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) ("the
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature,
in order... to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority"); Bork, supra
note 6, at 2-3.
89 This formulation is often associated with Alexander Bickel, who coined the now
commonplace phrase "countermajoritarian difficulty." "The root difficulty," Bickel
wrote, "is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our [democratic] system."
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). Bickel's formulation of the
problem has been increasingly rejected. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Rights
Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1063, 1066 (1981); Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An
Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1207, 1260
(1984); Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE. L.J. 1503, 1531-32 (1990).
o See J. LOCKE, supra note 38, §§ 197-98, at 110-11 (whoever obtains or exercises
power in a manner not authorized by the people has no right to be obeyed); § 243, at 139
(upon forfeiture through miscarriage by the legislature, the legislative power reverts to
the people); see also Bork, supra note 6, at 6 (nonoriginalist Court is "perpetrator of
limited coups d'etat"; the only possible response for a citizen who does not share the
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vitally important for originalists that judges "get it right"-that they make
decisions that accurately reflect the will of the sovereign people.
But how exactly should a court decide cases to assure that its decisions
accurately reflect the will of the people? Originalists contend that courts can
maintain fidelity to the will of the people only by adhering to original intent,
which they view as currently authoritative by virtue of the "carry-forward"
process outlined in the previous Part. As we shall see, however, this conclu-
sion does not necessarily follow from originalist political premises.
B. Grudging Consent and the Generation Gap
Simply because the current generation has consented to carry forward the
terms of the original understanding of the Constitution does not suggest that
all members of the current generation hold all the same views as the mem-
bers of the founding generation about the best way to structure our society
and government. It is quite possible that a majority of Americans disagrees
with the original understanding of many constitutional provisions. For
example, as we said earlier, most Americans today probably view flogging as
a cruel punishment even though, according to originalists, they have in some
sense consented to live under a constitutional regime in which flogging is not
considered cruel and in which they themselves may be flogged some day.
The result of this disjunction is a sort of "generation gap," in which soci-
ety at any given time contains a certain number of majorities, or
supermajorities, that dissent from various aspects of the original understand-
ing of the constitutional scheme. This would come as no surprise to original-
ists, who stress the constitutional amendment process as the proper way to
update the Constitution; obviously, the process of constitutional amendment
itself contemplates the coalescence of supermajoritarian dissent from some
aspect of the reigning constitutional scheme.
The existence of these generation gaps has implications for the enterprise
of constitutional interpretation. The aim of this enterprise, as noted above,
is to determine the powers of and enforce the restraints on government
according to the terms of the people's consent. In one very important sense
the terms of consent are those of the original understanding which have been
carried forward by new members upon entry into society; all members of
society have by hypothesis consented to be ruled by a government operating
under a set of instructions having a current meaning identical to the original
meaning. Nevertheless, on these assumptions, a society containing such a
generation gap would equally consent to be ruled by a government operating
under a Constitution that means something slightly different from what it
meant at the time of the founding.
Let us reconsider for a moment the concept of consent. Political legiti-
macy on the originalist model, as we have seen, depends upon the consent of
Court's moral and political views is to "ignore the Court whenever he can get away with
it and overthrow it if he can").
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the governed, and consent, especially the type of actual consent we have
been postulating, refers to a current state of mind of the citizen.9' Yet the
carry-forward process contemplated by originalism leaves most citizens in a
curious and complicated state of mind. On the one hand, they have con-
sented to be ruled under a particular existing regime; on the other hand, they
dislike some or many aspects of this regime, and would prefer to live under a
regime that conformed to all rather than just some of their preferences. The
existence of this dual state of mind in society's members raises an important
question about what we mean when we seek to determine the terms of popu-
lar consent. Do we mean the understanding of the Constitution to which the
people have assented in spite of their reservations and disagreements-the
91 See J. LOCKE, supra note 38, § 141, at 81 (governmental power is "derived from the
people by a positive voluntary grant"); A. SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING
GOVERNMENT 2:6, at 84 (Arno Press 1979) (1698) ("[iut is not therefore the bare
sufferance of a Government ..... nor silent submission when the power of opposing is
wanting, that can imply an Assent, or Election, and create a Right; but an explicit act of
Approbation, when Men have ability and courage to resist or deny"); see also H. BERAN,
supra note 43, at 60 (acceptance of membership which does not involve knowing assent to
the requirements of membership does not create a self-assumed obligation to obey the
state); R. FLATHMAN, supra note 81, at 220; Simmons, supra note 43, at 803. For a
discussion of the various states of mind that might be considered consensual, see
generally P. PARTRIDGE, CONSENT AND CONSENSUS 32-39 (1971).
John Simmons has argued that there is a distinction between the "attitudinal" and
"occurrence" aspects of consent, and that only the latter, by which he means voluntary
acts, can give rise to political obligation. J. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICAL OBLIGATION 93 (1979). While his account is helpful in highlighting the
aspects of consent that distinguish it from acquiescence or approval in other theories, cf
D. HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in HUME'S, MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 73, at 307 (the ultimate basis of government is "opinion"), it
seems incomplete. Regardless of whether an act is required to give the type of consent
that gives rise to political obligation upon entry into society, political obligation
undertaken by such consent continues until revoked. On Simmons' account, this means
one of two things. Either consent once given takes on a Hobbesian irrevocability, see T.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, chs. 13-17, at 104-43 (Bobbs-Merrill 1958)-a conclusion that
consent theorists since Locke have rejected--or consent must be continually reaffirmed
by appropriate acts. This latter possibility comports poorly with conventional
understandings of consent, although perhaps this fact indicates only that there are no
widely shared conventions governing the creation of binding tacit, as opposed to express,
consent. See H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 137; R. FLATHMAN, supra note 81, at 224.
Simmons' conclusion also seems to violate the postulate of free will that underlies most
versions of consent theory by suggesting that an individual cannot by will alone withdraw
his consent, but must act (or cease to act) to effectuate the decision. See J. SIMMONS,
supra, at 62-64. Thus, there seems to be some aspect of consent, or at least of continuing
consent, that is "attitudinal" as Simmons uses the term. On the other hand, it is also
possible that consent is not the only source of political obligation, and that such attitudes
unaccompanied by acts may be relevant to some nonconsensual basis for a continuing
obligation to obey the state.
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understanding to which they have given their "grudging" consent? Or do
we mean the constitutional understanding that the people would implement
right now if suddenly called upon to do so-the understanding to which they
would give their "whole-hearted" consent?
Even if we conclude, as I think we must, that grudging consent is suffi-
cient to confer political legitimacy on a regime,92 it certainly cannot be con-
sidered superior to whole-hearted consent as a basis for legitimacy, and,
under the model of consent-based positivism set out above, it seems clearly
worse. Just because legitimacy requires some threshold level of consent does
not mean that one regime cannot be more legitimate than another, depend-
ing upon how enthusiastically its people support it.9" If the mission of the
courts, under consent theory, is to assure political legitimacy by implement-
ing and enforcing the people's current will, the existence of a generation gap
might be precisely the kind of information a court needs in order to do the
best possible job.
Yet if originalists are united in anything, it is in their complete rejection of
the legitimacy of judicial inquiry into the existence or content of potential
generation gaps. If such gaps exist, they maintain, the people's only recourse
is to amend the Constitution. But what is the basis for this conclusion? As a
theoretical matter it seems to make little sense. While it is true, as we saw
earlier, that in a large society the terms of current consent are likely for
practical reasons to track those of the original consent, the existence and
92 According to most accounts of consent theory, the type of grudging consent under
discussion would not impair the validity of political authority or obligation unless it
reached the point of duress. See supra note 75. Of course, many writers feel that consent
is impossible in the modem world because no one really has any free choice about
whether to join a society or which society to join. See, e.g., D. HUME, supra note 73, at
363 (arguing that government is established by force and necessity, not consent);
Simmons, supra note 43. The distinction between grudging and whole-hearted consent
bears some resemblance to Simmons' distinction between "occurrence" and "attitudinal"
consent. See supra note 91. Simmons argues that occurrence consent is the type that
gives rise to political obligation. J. SIMMONS, supra note 91, at 79-100.
By suggesting that courts may take account of attitudinal varieties of consent, I am not
suggesting a shift from originalism's theory based on actual consent to one based on
hypothetical consent. Hypothetical consent theories view political obligation as based on
the goodness of the government rather than the. consent of the governed-that is, one
owes obedience to governments to which one ought to consent. See, e.g., Pitkin, supra
note 74, at 999 ("[l]egitimate government is government which deserves consent"). The
whole-hearted consent I discuss here is actual, not hypothetical. What is in a sense
hypothetical, however, is the act by which such consent is expressed. Rather than finding
expression through adoption of a constitutional amendment, such consent is voiced
through a court acting to ascertain the people's will.
93 Thomas Jefferson alluded to such a distinction: "all experience hath shown, that
mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves
by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." The Declaration of
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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popular toleration of this fact does not bind members of the current genera-
tion to follow the paths laid down for them long ago. 4 The very notion of
popular sovereignty means that autonomous, self-governing individuals pos-
sess the reason and the will to make fundamental political choices for them-
selves.95 To suggest, then, that courts must adhere to the original
11 Originalists are fond of pointing to John Marshall's famous comment that the
Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819), and to Madison's remark that if "the sense in which the
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation... be not the guide to expounding
it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable [government]." Letter from James
Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
190, 191 (G. Hunt, ed. 1910). But Marshall and Madison were among the most forceful
and influential exponents of consent-based positivism. Marshall's decision in McCulloch,
for example, is one of the most straightforward and influential expositions of consent-
based positivism to be found in the writings of the founding generation. See McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 403-05 ("The government of the Union .... is, .... a government of the
people. In form and substance it emanates from them."). Similarly, Madison's embrace
of consent-based positivism is clear throughout his writings. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST,
supra note 36, No. 37, at 227 (republican liberty requires that all power derive from the
people), No. 49, at 314 (people are the only legitimate source of governmental authority).
Unless these statements are radical departures from the primary political theory held not
only by these two men but by the vast majority of the founders, see generally G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1789 344-89, 543-47, 593-615
(1969), the statements must be understood to express only the hope, and perhaps the
conviction, that future generations would accept the Constitution as the best possible
constitution to live under. See Hamburger, The Constitution's Accomodation of Social
Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989). But Marshall's and Madison's remarks hardly
suggest that the founders thought that future generations must be slaves to the founders'
intent because of some inherent authority that they as founders possessed. See Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing
that the assumption that the framers expected that the Constitution would be construed
according to what future interpreters could learn of the framers' intent is historically
incorrect).
Although he was not a participant in the drafting of the Constitution, Thomas
Jefferson also strongly believed that one generation lacked the power to bind another. See
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488, 491 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds.
1972) (stating that "no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual
law. The earth belongs always to the living generation"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), reprinted in id. at 675 ("Each generation is as
independent of the one preceding, as that was of all which had gone... before. It has,
then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most
promotive of its own happiness."). For this reason, Jefferson argued that a constitution
should contain a provision for its revision every 19 or 20 years, corresponding to the
passing of each generation. Id.
95 H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 26-27 (democratic liberalism assumes that people are
capable of "personal self-determination"); see also Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins
of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449 (1989).
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understanding is to suggest the very sort of Burkean prescription which is
antithetical to the notion of governmental legitimacy based on the current
consent of the governed. As our own founding amply demonstrates,9 no
form of government need be considered binding on the people merely
because it is old, or established, or original.
Although originalist political theory does not, as I have argued, compel
the anti-updating rule, the rule is not necessarily inconsistent with original-
ism. In fact, there are two possible justifications for the rule that are fully
consistent with the premises of consent-based positivism. The first possibil-
ity is that courts may give effect only to the original terms of consent as
originally understood because that is what the people want the courts to
do-the rule happens as a factual matter to be a part of their instructions.
The second possibility is that courts must look only to the terms of original
consent because that method is, practically speaking, the most consistently
reliable method available to the courts to ascertain and implement the peo-
ple's current will. Both these possibilities yield the conclusion that the anti-
updating rule is at bottom a rule expressing, for pragmatic reasons, a
requirement that the people's instructions to the courts be in writing.
C. Originalism's Preference for Written Instructions
Suppose we were able to conclude that it is the wish of the sovereign peo-
ple that the courts apply the anti-updating rule in constitutional cases. That
is, the people at the time of the founding wanted the courts to implement
their instructions as the people themselves then understood them, and subse-
quent generations then carried forward this interpretational instruction,
sometimes referred to as the founders' "meta-intent." '  Thus, courts today
are bound to adhere to the original understanding not so much because the
founders wanted it that way, but because the current generation has made
the founders' wish its own.
At the outset it is worth noting that this position presents an interesting
conundrum. As noted earlier, the process by which original intent is carried
forward allows for the opening of generation gaps with respect to particular
96I refer here to both the throwing off of the British constitution by the American
colonies, and the subsequent discarding of the Articles of Confederation in favor of the
Constitution.
97 The term "meta-intent" appears most frequently in the literature of statutory
interpretation to refer to legislative directives concerning rules of construction. See, e.g.,
Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 324 (1989); Farber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 309-17 (1989). The
concept, however, is common in the literature of constitutional interpretation as well.
See, e.g., Brest, supra note 8, at 215-16 (the first task of an intentionalist interpeter is to
determine the interpretive intentions of the adopters); Farber, supra note 1, at 1089-91
(noting that originalism itself can be examined from an originalist perspective by asking
whether the framers believed that their own intentions should control constitutional
interpretation); see also infra note 99.
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aspects of the original terms of consent. Logically, however, a generation
gap could also open with respect to the people's interpretational meta-intent
as easily as it could open with respect to the scope of the eighth amend-
ment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. A generation gap of this sort
would suggest that although the people have consented to be ruled by a gov-
ernment following a set of instructions which is to be interpreted according
to the original understanding, they would in fact currently prefer, and would
therefore consent, to be ruled instead by a government following those
instructions as the people understand them now." But the only way a court
could discover the existence of such a generation gap would be to attempt to
determine the people's current meta-intent, a judicial action that would itself
violate the very meta-intent that originalism presumes the people to
maintain.
But let us set this possibility aside, and simply assume that, whether as a
result of the carrying forward of a term of the original consent" or because
they currently think it a good thing, the people presently wish courts to take
the terms of current consent to be the same as those of the original consent,
unless altered by constitutional amendment. This is certainly originalism's
strongest and most consistent basis for its prophylactic rule of constitutional
interpretation: adherence to original intent is a direct and current command
of the sovereign people, a violation of which constitutes judicial usurpation
of authority in derogation of the legitimacy of the present government.
But let us consider this interpretational meta-intent more closely.
Originalism's underlying political theory assumes that society's members are
rational self-governors who out of necessity employ agents to implement
98 Of course, the people's interpretational meta-intent might be parasitic on their
substantive preferences with regard to particular constitutional provisions. Thus, if the
people dislike the original understanding of a particular provision, they might be
disinclined toward a meta-intent that would fix that provision with its original meaning.
Conversely, if they approve of the original understanding of a provision, they might be
tempted to adopt a meta-intent that would prevent judicial tinkering with the meaning of
that provision.
99 There is evidence that the founders did not intend that their intentions be the
exclusive measure of the meaning of the Constitution. See Powell, supra note 94; Sherry,
The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1127 (1984) (arguing that the
framers saw natural law, not their own subjective intent, as the source of constitutional
law). But see Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 296, 333-35 (1986) (arguing that Madison, Hamilton and Iredell intended the
Constitution to be binding on the people until changed by amendment); Rotunda,
Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV.
507, 516 (1988) ("History does not support the position of those ... who claim that the
framers and ratifiers did not intend the judiciary to look at original intent."). For an
intermediate position, see Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987) (arguing that
originalist and nonoriginalist views are both too extreme, and that the framers intended
both flexibility and stability in constitutional interpretation).
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their wishes. Presumably, rational principals would prefer that their agents
act at all times consistently with their actual wishes. Yet by postulating a
meta-intent in favor of the original understanding of the Constitution unless
varied by a subsequent amendment, originalism holds that the sovereign
people have essentially issued standing instructions to their governmental
agents in the following terms: "Do what I said, not what I want." Or,
perhaps more accurately: "Do what I said, and don't worry about whether
what I said is what I want."
Why would arational principal instruct an agent to follow literally an old
set of written instructions until updated by new written instructions even
when the principal might now prefer that the agent act differently? The
most plausible reason is that the principal fears that the agent will do some-
thing that the principal does not want the agent to do. So strong is this fear
that the principal prefers the agent to continue doing things that the princi-
pal no longer wishes the agent to do, rather than allowing the agent the
discretion to try to meet the principal's current desires when there is a risk
that the agent will misunderstand or mistake the principal's current desires
in some unforeseen way.
Consent-based positivism offers a ready explanation for such fears. Polit-
ical legitimacy, on originalist assumptions, depends upon the consent of the
governed. It would be best, of course, for the government to conform
entirely to the terms on which the current consent of the people would most
satisfactorily be based. On the other hand, it is often difficult to determine
the terms of current consent, and courts could err in trying to deduce such
terms. Such an error would permit the government to act in a way that does
not command the consent of the governed, thereby undermining the govern-
ment's political legitimacy. To avoid the possibility of such errors, the peo-
ple might adopt a rule requiring the courts faithfully to adhere to the
people's last set of written instructions, even if those instructions no longer
meet with full popular approval, on the theory that the courts are less likely
to fall into serious error under such a rule than if they had free rein to do
whatever they thought necessary to implement the people's current
wishes.'0°
What originalism boils down to, then, is a preference for a writing. It is a
constitutional form of the Statute of Frauds, according to which only the
written instructions of the people, as expressed in the text of the Constitution
or in amendments, are entitled to legal force. And this rule is based on the
theory that it is less dangerous for courts to adhere to instructions that the
100 For a more extended discussion of the types of strategies that principals might
want to use to control the discretion of their agents in the context of legislative
supremacy, see Eskridge, supra note 97, at 327-30; see also Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
L.J. 509, 544 (1988) (formalism is desirable if the goal is to limit decisional opportunities
of certain classes of decisionmakers).
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people once issued but have since abandoned than it is for them to invent
and enforce instructions that the people never issued and do not accept. 101
Although originalism can provide coherent and internally consistent
grounds for employing a statute of frauds-type rule of original intent, it by
no means follows that those same grounds suffice to justify the iron-clad
prophylactic rule against judicial updating championed by most originalists.
I shall argue in the next Part that originalists overestimate the benefits of
their requirement of a constitutional writing, and that the goals of original-
ism might be better served by a more flexible approach to constitutional
decisionmaking.
V. ORIGINALIST JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEPARTING FROM ORIGINALISM
A. The Benefits and Costs of Originalism
Originalists view the protection of political legitimacy as the principal
benefit of the anti-updating rule. Even if the current preferred understand-
ing of a particular constitutional provision differs from the original under-
standing, a court's adherence to original intent results in the commission of
known errors, which originalists prefer to the unknown errors that a court
might commit if it had license to attempt to update the provision to conform
to contemporary preferences. Because the original understanding has been
carried forward by subsequent generations, adherence to that understanding
guarantees conformity at least to the grudging consent with which the origi-
nal understanding was adopted by the current generation. Courts thus pre-
serve a minimum level of governmental legitimacy by employing the anti-
updating rule.
This argument, while sound up to a point, overstates the benefits for legiti-
macy that originalism purports to provide. First, originalists often speak as
though the anti-updating rule absolutely guarantees political legitimacy.
That is not the case. A government is legitimate when it has the consent of
the governed-period. There is no rule, either of positivist political theory
or of logic, that requires a people to consent to a particular constitutional
regime. 10 2 Nor does such a rule arise solely because a people's ancestors
101 Compare Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of the
U.C.C.'s Substantive Provisions-the Quality Problem, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 811, 840
("Historically, endorsement or abhorrence of the statute [of frauds] has depended upon
which of two evils one viewed as the worse: the successful assertion of false claims or the
successful escape from legitimate ones.").
102 Some theorists who write from the perspective of hypothetical consent claim that
there are certain types of governments or constitutions to which a rational person would
and should consent. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Pitkin, supra
note 74, at 999 ("Legitimate government is government which deserves consent").
Hypothetical consent theories thus provide a basis for claiming that a regime that meets
certain moral criteria is entitled to exercise legitimate political authority, and justly to
demand obedience. Actual consent theories look in contrast to the act of the citizen
rather than the nature of the regime as the source of legitimate political authority and
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founded and consented to a particular system. As Thomas Jefferson put it,
the people have the right "to institute new Government, laying its founda-
tion on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."' x3 Whenever
the people become dissatisfied with a regime they can revoke their consent,
regardless of whether or when they created that regime.' No rule of consti-
tutional interpretation can alter this political fact.
Second, a stiff-necked judicial adherence to the original understanding has
the potential to create a sort of institutional ossification that could have the
unintended and wholly undesired consequence of actually increasing popular
dissatisfaction with the current regime.'05 If current sentiment runs against
the original understanding of a particular constitutional provision, judicial
fidelity to the old understanding may serve as a continual irritant, one which
might, in extreme cases, tend to erode consent, and thus legitimacy.'
°
obligation. See generally H. BERAN, supra note 43, at 137. Because originalists embrace
a version of consent theory based on actual, not hypothetical consent, see supra notes 38-
42 and accompanying text, the nature of the specific terms of consent is irrelevant to the
legitimacy of political authority or the existence of political obligation. For originalists,
adherence by the government to the terms of the Constitution, regardless of whether
those terms are good or bad, just or unjust, is all that is required for legitimacy.
103 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This is not necessarily
inconsistent with the views of hypothetical consent theorists like Pitkin or Rawls, supra
note 102; even on their view, there must be some level of specificity in institutional
structure at which it simply makes no difference to the goodness or justness of the regime
what institution is adopted.
104 Of course, the possibility of such revocation ought not to obscure the
consequences. As Jefferson wrote: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes." The Declaration of
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
105 Chief Justice John Marshall himself, a favorite of originalists, seems to have
suggested that the Constitution was intended to be a flexible document:
[The Constitution was] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by
which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be
best provided for as they occur.... If we apply this principle of construction to any
of the powers of the government, we shall find it so pernicious in its operation that
we shall be compelled to discard it.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415-16 (1819). Originalists tend to read
this language narrowly to suggest only that the Constitution is capable of application to
factual circumstances unforeseen by the founders, not that the substantive content of the
document can change to fit contemporary needs. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 2, at
694-95; Scalia, supra note 2, at 853; see also Munzer & Nickel, supra note 11, at 1032
(constitutional rigidity undesirable).
1O A powerful example of the ability of the judiciary to exercise its powers in a way
that undermines popular consent is of course Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
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A second benefit of the anti-updating rule is that it provides courts with a
bright-line rule that allows them to avoid some very difficult evaluations of
the current state of consent. A rule of constitutional decisionmaking that
permits courts to rely on current norms and preferences would, of course,
require the courts to ascertain the content of those norms. This is much
easier said than done. In the first place, every constitutional case conducted
under such a rule would involve two competing claims about the contours of
current consent. For instance, one party would claim that "evolving stan-
dards of decency" hold flogging to be cruel, while the other party claimed
that flogging is consistent with such standards.'07
Further, an integral function of the courts in constitutional cases is to
identify and reject false claims about the terms of popular consent expressed
in the Constitution. An important purpose of the Constitution is to place
certain rights and institutional decisions beyond the reach of temporary pop-
ular majorities-to protect the cool and reasoned deliberations made in what
Sotirios Barber has called "the constitutional frame of mind" 08 from hasty
decisions made under the influence of popular passion.' Allowing the
Court to update the Constitution to conform to the terms of current consent
would require it to distinguish between those popular views that are based
on passion, and thus not part of the "real" terms of consent, and those that
are sufficiently mature and reflective to take their place beside other full-
blown constitutional principles. The difficulty, to say nothing of the danger,
of such an enterprise is obvious, and originalism's bright line anti-updating
rule allows courts to avoid such decisions.
With the benefits of originalism, however, come certain costs. First, the
anti-updating rule prevents courts from conforming the Constitution to the
requirements of whole-hearted, current consent. The anti-updating rule is
based on the fear that courts may get it wrong, but it is also possible for
393 (1857) (a freed slave is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution), a
decision which contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War. By way of comparison, one
might ask what would have happened if the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially segregated schools are inherently unequal and, therefore,
violative of the Constitution), had adhered to its earlier decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) ("separate but equal" accomodations are constitutionally
acceptable), assuming that Plessy in turn adhered faithfully to the original intentions of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By
JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 126-29.
107 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (eighth amendment forbids forced
expatriation as cruel and unusual punishment).
108 S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 197 (1984).
lO See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 10 (J. Madison) (arguing that the
most important advantage of a well-designed Union is the tendency to break and control
factionalism); C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 105-07 (1960) (noting the
importance of binding legal limitation on the power of immediately elected government);
S. BARBER, supra note 108, at 198; Bork, supra note 6, at 2-3 ("There are some things a
majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them.").
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courts to get it right-they might accurately discern a permanent shift in the
people's mature wishes and by updating the constitutional provision accord-
ingly, make the Constitution into a document that commands the current
whole-hearted consent of the people.11 ° Such an outcome would increase the
happiness and stability of society, as well as the overall legitimacy of the
government and its actions.
Second, the anti-updating rule places enormous emphasis on the constitu-
tional amendment process. But the amendment process is largely inade-
quate to meet originalism's ultimate goals. The anti-updating rule requires
the people to amend the Constitution whenever they want to update it to
conform more closely to their current wishes. There are two difficulties with
this aspect of the rule. First, it will rarely be worthwhile for any group to
undertake the costly process of pushing a constitutional amendment through
to ratification. Most instances in which current consent differs from the
original understanding are likely to concern relatively minor constitutional
provisions, or applications of those provisions that affect comparatively few
people."' These factors combine to discourage most people from undertak-
ing the expense and effort of shepherding an amendment through the legisla-
tive and ratification processes for what will in most instances be a relatively
slight payoff.
Second, even when a constitutional change is desired strongly enough to
prompt action, there are many ways in which the political process itself can
frustrate the amendment process. 1 2 Political logrolling, imperfect access to
the political arena among unpopular groups, and other procedural impedi-
ments may prevent an amendment from being considered or adopted. Of the
more than 5,000 constitutional amendments that have been proposed in
Congress since 1789, only twenty-six have been ratified."' It is inconceiv-
able that all of the unadopted proposals failed solely because of some
uncanny ability of the amendment process accurately to reflect the lack of
supermajority support among the general populace.'"
110 This is of course the same objection often made to the Statute of Frauds. See
Bruckel, supra note 101; cf Chemerinsky, supra note 64, at 1250 (asserting that a critical
question for constitutional interpretation is which risks of error are more acceptable,
those of the judiciary or those of the legislature).
ill For example, even if everyone agreed that the equal protection clause should apply
to discrimination against recent Vietnamese immigrants, the number of individuals
directly affected by the scope of the clause on this issue is small relative to the population
as a whole. Other examples might include the provisions establishing the length of the
terms of elected officials. People might agree that it would be somewhat better for the
President to serve a five-year term or for representatives to serve for three years instead of
two, but most who held such views would probably not think them a high priority for
political action.
112 See generally J. ELY, supra note 47, at 77-88.
113 Pringle, Americans Fired Up to Protect Old Glory, THE INDEPENDENT, June 17,
1990, at 11.
114 See Brest, supra note 8, at 236-37 (stating that "the formal process of amendment
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If, as I argue, the amendment process is not a terribly efficient vehicle for
conforming the Constitution to the terms of current consent, then original-
ism places the people in an uncomfortable position: they must live under the
rule of agents who will respond only to specific written instructions, yet they
lack a truly effective way to put new instructions before those agents. What
results is a prescription for popular frustration with government--exactly
the opposite of what originalism is intended to accomplish.
All this suggests that a rigid anti-updating rule, though not without bene-
fits, accomplishes a good deal less in the way of assuring political legitimacy
than originalists contend, and indeed may well have the opposite effect of
eroding the popular consent on which legitimacy rests. Although this con-
clusion hardly means that the rule serves no purpose, it does cast doubt upon
the need for the prophylactic version of the rule for which originalists typi-
cally argue. Originalism's goal of assuring political legitimacy might be bet-
ter served by a more flexible approach to constitutional updating, one that
would permit courts to consider the terms of the people's current consent
when to do so would enhance rather than undermine legitimacy.115 The real
challenge to originalism, then, is to define when and under what circum-
stances the anti-updating rule may be relaxed, rather than whether it may be
relaxed-to provide a theory of what Justice Scalia has self-mockingly called
"faint-hearted originalism." 116 In the next section, I suggest some factors
that might influence the formulation of such a relaxed anti-updating rule.
is too cumbersome to bear sole responsibility for constitutional change"); Carter, supra
note 83, at 841-42 (stating that the complexity of the amendment process discourages
even amendments with broad popular support); Sandalow, supra note 7, at 1046 (the
amendment process is poorly suited to protect minorities against injuries sustained as a
result of legislative inaction or neglect); Simon, Authority of the Framers, supra note 55,
at 1501, 1509 (early originalists did not anticipate economic and political diversity in
formulating the amendment process).
115 By way of comparison, the Statute of Frauds, which aims at preventing the
successful assertion of false contractual claims, see generally Bruckel, supra note 101, is
itself an exception to the general rule that writings are not required to form a binding
contract. Moreover, the Statute is riddled with exceptions even where it applies. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201; CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624 (West 1985) (California Statute of Frauds
and related decisions); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59, 1, 2 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (Illinois
Statute of Frauds and related decisions); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-703 (McKinney
1989) (New York Statute of Frauds and related decisions). This suggests that experience
has taught what should be obvious anyway: that a prophylactic requirement of a writing
would be an unworkable rule of contract. For more on the Statute of Frauds, see
generally Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of
Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1974) (arguing that the requirement of clear and
convincing evidence should be substituted for the requirement of a writing).
116 Scalia, supra note 2, at 861.
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B. When to Bend the Rules: Some Preliminary Thoughts
1. The Congressional Paradigm
The object of a relaxed anti-updating rule would be to achieve a happier
and more stable society in which the governed give their whole-hearted con-
sent to the ruling regime, while avoiding the dangers of judicial usurpation
of popular authority. The principal difficulty in developing such a rule is the
inescapable fact that any judicial updating of the Constitution requires
courts in some way to ascertain the people's wishes without the benefit of an
authoritative written statement of those wishes.
Originalists, of course, question whether unelected judges can possibly
determine the people's will without specific written guidance. Originalists
point for their model to Congress, which is elected, accountable, and
designed to be responsive to popular desires.'17 Courts, originalists argue,
fall so far short of this legislative paradigm that they are incapable of per-
forming the task of discerning the people's wishes."'
Congress itself, however, is far from the infallible barometer of popular
opinion described by originalists, and to rely on Congress as a model of
accountability and responsiveness grossly distorts the standard to which
other institutions such as the judiciary should be held in discerning the peo-
ple's current will. First, members of Congress normally get their informa-
tion about their constituents' wishes in anecdotal and unsystematic ways-
for example, through phone and mail contacts by self-selecting and highly
motivated constituents and interest groups, or through conversations with
unrepresentative friends, colleagues and acquaintances. Opinion polls," 9 a
somewhat more systematic method of obtaining information, are so notori-
ously sensitive to the wording of questions as to be of doubtful utility;120 they
117 See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 699 (the Constitution is designed to enable the
legislature rather than the judiciary to deal with the problems of changing society); see
also J. ELY, supra note 47, at 4 (the policy-making power of elected, representative
institutions is a distinguishing characteristic of a constitutional system); Maltz, supra
note 25, at 819-21 (analyzing defenses of interpretivism that argue that "judges should
defer to the policy decisions of electorally accountable governmental officials").
11 See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 698-99, 706; Nomination of Bork, supra note
4, at 371-72 (remarks of Monaghan); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 10 (1980) ("Although the Supreme Court may play a
vital role in the preservation of the American democratic system, the procedure is in
conflict with the fundamental principle of democracy-majority rule under conditions of
political freedom."); see also J. ELY, supra note 47, at 4-5; Scalia, supra note 2, at 863-64.
119 Professor Barber has argued that polls are by their nature inadequate tools to
measure accurately the people's mature and reflective views on the meaning of the
Constitution: "[It would probably take a lengthy dialogue with a trusted and friendly
critic to bring out [the people's] real views about what the Constitution means and ought
to mean." S. BARBER, supra note 108, at 48.
120 See, e.g., Dionne, Abortion Poll: Not Clear Cut-Wording of a Question Makes a
Big Difference, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1980, at A15. Politicians' polls of their constituents
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are also expensive and underutilized in any event outside the campaign con-
text. Elections themselves are also highly imperfect indicators of popular
support for any or all of an elected candidate's positions on the issues2'
Even if Congress could obtain consistently reliable information about the
people's wishes, it is not at all clear that Congress would or should always
act consistently with those wishes. Wholly apart from the structural impedi-
ments to majoritarian rule created by our politicial institutions, 22 our sys-
tem of government embraces a long-established tradition of legislative
independence in which elected representatives are viewed as more than the
people's messengers or scribes. Instead, legislators are elected at least in part
because of their knowledge, wisdom, and devotion to the common good, and
it is expected that from time to time these qualities will cause legislators to
vote in ways that directly contradict the wishes of a majority of their constit-
uents, even when those wishes are reliably known."2
seem especially prone to slanted wording, perhaps because politicians use polls to justify
positions that the candidate already holds. For example, my own state senator recently
made a mass mailing of a constituent opinion poll. One question asked: "Should cable
television franchises be awarded on a competitive basis as a way to keep down the cost of
service to customers?" LEGISLATIVE REPORT FROM [NEW YORK STATE] SENATOR JOE
BRUNO 4 (1990). Not surprisingly, 94% of those polled answered affirmatively.
121 See K. ARROW, supra note 84, at 2-3 (stating that the "paradox of voting" is that
when individuals cast votes among two or three choices, the result can be a social
decision that a majority actually voted against).
122 See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note. 118, at 12-25. Public choice theorists have
elaborated in some detail the divergence between the theory and practice of majoritarian
democratic self-rule. See, e.g., K. ARROW, supra note 84. For an overview of how public
choice theory relates to the law, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
123 This view of the role of the elected representative is most strongly associated with
Edmund Burke. According to Burke, "[y]our representative owes you, not his industry
only, but his judgment; and betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your
opinion." E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 218 (1988) (quoting 2 WORKS OF
EDMUND BURKE 95 (1839)). This view goes back at least to the Socratic model of
benevolent and enlightened governmental leadership. See, e.g., PLATO'S REPUBLIC, Bks.
2-3 (G.M.A. Grube trans. 1974). The view of the representative as free to vote against
the wishes of his constituents fell partially into disfavor in America by virtue of its
association with the English defense of the parliamentary system of "virtual
representation." According to the theory of virtual representation, the interests of the
American colonies were represented in Parliament even if the colonists themselves elected
no representatives because Parliament's job was to look out for the interests of all English
subjects at all times. See E. MORGAN, supra, at 240-45.
The rejection of virtual representation led the founders to stress frequent popular
elections as a way to ensure the legislature's "dependence on, and ... intimate sympathy
with, the people." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, No. 52, at 327 (J. Madison). Of
course, the founders' concern did not extend to the assurance of universal suffrage, thus
putting all women, most blacks and many of the poor under the very system of virtual
representation Americans had condemned when practiced by the English. See, e.g.,
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Finally, to the extent that Congress accurately reflects popular wishes, our
political system contemplates that Congress is at least as worthy of suspicion
as it is of respect. Congress is the main vehicle by which the people express
their transient passions and write them into law. But these passions differ by
definition from what our political system understands to be the people's gen-
uine, reasoned, long-term desires-which is why the institution of judicial
review permits courts to strike down federal laws even when they are passed
unanimously. Thus, the responsiveness of Congress to popular desires does
not necessarily argue for its competence at distinguishing the people's all-
important constitutional frame of mind.
2. Ways of Knowing the People's Wishes
These observations suggest that if we are to take seriously the originalist
assumption that the will of the people is knowable, we must nonetheless
acknowledge that any institution is likely to face considerable difficulty in
discerning any of the people's wishes, much less their true, reflective consti-
tutional wishes. But the difficulty of the job, as originalists often proclaim
when defending the process of historical inquiry into the founder's inten-
tions, is not a justification for shirking it.' 24 Indeed, originalists cannot logi-
cally maintain that judges are unable accurately to divine the people's
current intentions when originalists view similar inquiries into the intentions
of a generation two hundred years old as eminently feasible. 12 A method
Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335,
337 (1989) (noting that by the middle of the eighteenth century, "all the American
colonies save one had adopted property qualifications for the suffrage"). In any event, the
Burkean conception of representation still plays an important role in our current
conventional understanding of electoral representation. See generally H. PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
124 See, e.g., Meese, Construing, supra note 3, at 26 (acknowledging the importance of
applying the principles expressed in the Constitution); Scalia, supra note 2, at 856-57,
863; see also Kay, supra note 5, at 236-43; Maltz, supra note 7, at 796.
125 In a recent book, Raoul Berger criticizes the Supreme Court for attempting to
discern the contours of a contemporary social consensus about what types of punishment
should be considered cruel and unusual. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 6,
at 122-27. Although he derides the Court's conclusions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), as "tea-leaf readings of public sentiment," id. at 125, Berger focuses more on
what he regards as the impropriety of the Court's departure from original intent than on
any errors the Court may have made in divining contemporary popular will concerning
the death penalty.
Berger's position is at times inconsistent. At one point, he notes that a judge's search
for society's values leads only to discovery of the judge's personal values. R. BERGER,
DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 6, at 123 (quoting Ely, Foreward On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 16 (1978)). If Berger's conclusion is true of
the search for contemporary social values, one can only wonder how a judge could avoid
the same trap when examining the values of the founding generation. Berger also argues
that courts are not responsive to the popular will, and are therefore unsuited to the
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for determining the contours of the popular will that worked better for
ancient problems than for current ones would be strange indeed.
How then, on originalist assumptions, can judges learn the people's cur-
rent will? Our society is simply too large for any individual or institution to
obtain direct evidence of the popular will,' 26 so any such knowledge must be
based on circumstantial evidence. To judge by recent originalist works, the
types of evidence courts would want to consider might be drawn from poli-
tics, language, cultural and economic institutions, religion, art, and the
like.' Illuminating resources would probably include everything from
records of debates in Congress, decisions of state courts, and presidential
proclamations, to popular books and newspapers. The recency of the events
might also permit consultation of scientific studies and other resources-
polls, for example. It would be up to originalists, however, to decide
whether any but the traditional sources meet their standards of accuracy and
reliability.'m
divination of the people's current will. Id. at 123-25. Again, Berger never explains why
the same argument does not apply when courts are called upon to divine the will of a
generation long dead. Further, Berger criticizes the Court for ignoring "state referenda
between 1964 and 1970, rejecting abolition, and . . .divided public sentiment on the
subject," id. at 125, an oversight that he apparently views as the cause of the court's
misreading of the tea leaves. He thus seems to concede that it is possible correctly to
figure out current public opinion, as he himself does, though the Court did not. Berger
never explains what it is that disqualifies a judge, but not an academic, from making these
types of judgments. But cf. Scalia, supra note 2, at 857 (originalism is "a task sometimes
better suited to the historian than the lawyer").
126 That is, it would be impossible for any individual actually to canvass the entire
population to determine firsthand what everybody thinks.
1' Any investigation of the practice of originalist history must surely focus on the
work of Raoul Berger, probably the originalist who more than any other actually engages
in the process of originalist historical inquiry. In the second chapter of GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, Berger relies on a wide variety of sources including the
following: the text of the Constitution and federal, state and local statutes, id. at 20, 22-
36; legislative debates, id. at 22-30; philosophers and legal commentators, id. at 20-21;
judicial decisions, id. at 29-34; and writings and public statements of the founders, id. at
21, 28 n.28, 35 n.55. Elsewhere in the work he also refers to: post-enactment public
statements of members of Congress who passed the fourteenth amendment, id. at 49-51;
analyses of the historical political context, id. at 52-53, 70-71; demographic data, id. at
58; public and private writings and remarks of prominent historical figures, id. at 58, 72
n.8, 87, 88-89, 291; intellectual history, id. at 60, 230-45; the debates at the original
constitutional convention, id. at 77-78, 300-02; congressional reports, id. at 84; the
Declaration of Independence, id. at 87-88; historical social practices, id. at 123; political
pressures faced by key congressional figures, id. at 233-34; historical understandings of
words, id. at 270; and state constitutions of the revolutionary period, id. at 287, 352.
128 One question originalists would have to confront is whether to count as legitimate
resources the judge's own beliefs, values and experiences as a participant in the common
culture-general resources that judges claim to rely on in any type of decision-making.
See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocESS 113 (1921) (the judge "must
1991]
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If this type of inquiry into the terms of contemporary popular consent is
feasible, then the real controversy centers not on whether it is possible for
judges to accumulate useful information about the terms of current consent,
but on the question of what degree of judicial certainty regarding those
terms can justify permitting judges to take the risks of judicial usurpation
associated with updating the Constitution.
C. A Standard for Judicial Updating?
Professor H. Jefferson Powell observed recently that much of the attrac-
tion of originalism lies in the promise it holds out for escaping personal
responsibility for what often seem like difficult political decisions.m
Originalism allows constitutional decisionmakers to deny that they them-
selves are making any sort of far-reaching social or political choices; instead,
originalism allows them to claim that any such choices were made by the
founders long ago and that the current decision-makers merely give effect, as
they must, to the founders' will."m In this way, originalism often reduces
constitutional decisionmaking to an empirical inquiry focusing on the beliefs
and wishes of the founders. While this feature of originalism does not by
itself decrease the possibility of disagreement, it does have the related advan-
tage of moving the plane of disagreement to a somewhat drier and more
technical level than it might otherwise occupy. Thus, disagreements among
originalists are likely to focus more on the reliability and weight to be
accorded particular pieces of historical evidence than on the wisdom of any
given constitutional decision."3 1 This capacity of originalism to reduce con-
troversial constitutional questions to uncontroversial empirical ones operates
both when applying originalist techniques to problems of ascertaining the
get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection;
in brief, from life itself"). If some originalist approaches to analogous questions of
statutory interpretation are any guide, the answer may well be that originalists would not
consider the judge's knowledge and experience of the common culture a legitimate
resource. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983); see
also supra note 125.
129 Powell, supra note 11, at 659-60 ("Originalism's attractiveness ... lies in the
possibility it seems to offer the judicial interpreter of an escape from personal
responsibility."); see also Maltz, supra note 7, at 779-80 (noting apparent "neutrality" of
judicial decision-making using originalist methods).
130 A remark of Justice Black is paradigmatic of this attitude. When asked in a
television interview about certain of the Court's unpopular decisions, Justice Black
responded: "Well, the Court didn't do it .... The Constitution did it." Kay, supra note
5, at 226 (quoting Justice Black and the Bill of Rights (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 3,
1968)); see also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
705 (1975) (stating that "[u]nder the pure interpretive model ... , when a court strikes
down a popular statute or practice as unconstitutional, it may always reply to the
resulting public outcry: 'We didn't do it-you did' ").
131 For a general discussion of the "intellectually responsible use of history... [by] an
originalist and interpreter," see Powell, supra note 11, at 660 passim.
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terms of current consent and when applying them to determine the historical
intent of the founders.
An important, yet often overlooked, "technical" question that originalists
face involves determining the evidentiary standard needed to establish a con-
stitutionally relevant historical intention for purposes of constitutional deci-
sionmaking. That question, always relevant to originalist inquiry, takes on
added significance in the context of relaxing the anti-updating rule because
the principal justification for the rule is the difficulty of knowing with cer-
tainty the unwritten current will of the people.'
3 2
Asssume that a court has before it an eighth amendment challenge to a
law prescribing flogging as a punishment for petty larceny. Assume further
that the court is committed to originalism, but is receptive to the idea of a
relaxed version of the anti-updating rule for the reasons given in the previous
section. The court has received evidence, heard arguments, and conducted
its own research, and has concluded, using standard originalist methods,
that the punishment of flogging for such a crime cannot be considered cruel
according to the original understanding of the eighth amendment. The
court, however, has also received evidence on and researched current atti-
tudes concerning what constitutes cruel punishments. The judges are fairly
well satisfied on the basis of their study that there is a reflective social con-
sensus among United States citizens today that flogging would be cruel in
the circumstances of the case before them. They believe that a ruling updat-
ing the language of the eighth amendment to reflect this new consensus
would bring the authoritative meaning of the Constitution closer to the
meaning that society currently supports. They also agree that the Constitu-
tion thus construed would command'a greater degree of whole-hearted con-
sent than a Constitution containing an eighth amendment construed
according to the original understanding.
On the other hand, the judges must also feel some trepidation. They
believe they are right, but what if they are wrong, and the people of the
United States really do not view flogging as cruel? If so, then their ruling
would reflect their own attitudes rather than those of society, and their deci-
sion would, without proper authorization, saddle the people with a version
of the eighth amendment that the people have never approved and do not
want to live under. But how sure ought the judges be before deciding to
update the text?
A full resolution of this question really requires two empirical analyses
because in order to know whether a proposed determination would amount
to updating at all, originalists must first decide the original meaning of the
constitutional text. A strange gap exists in originalist discourse on this
point. 133 Although originalism utilizes the anti-updating rule for the very
132 See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
"I See Powell, supra note 11, at 660 (noting that the argument for originalism
intrinsically requires the interpreter to determine what the original intent objectively was,
before addressing what the Constitution now means).
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purpose of eliminating the risk of judicial usurpation, that same risk exists,
as many critics have pointed out,l 4 even in the seemingly straightforward
evaluation of original intent: judges must correctly perform the task of his-
torical reconstruction, or risk interpreting the Constitution according to
their own rather than the founders' lights." 5 Yet, few originalists have
attempted to articulate a standard or set of criteria for evaluating the relia-
bility of historical inquiry.
One of the few scholars to address this point, albeit in a somewhat differ-
ent context, is Earl Maltz, one of originalism's most articulate and theoreti-
cally sophisticated defenders. Maltz has argued at some length that the
validity of originalism does not depend on achieving certainty in historical
analysis of the founders' intentions: "[Originalists do not claim to] know
with certainty what the drafters would have thought about a particular situ-
ation in a particular context .... In fact, originalist theory simply directs
judges to use their best efforts to determine what the intent of the drafters
would be in a particular situation."'"0 Because originalism is nothing more
than a "label" connoting "a complex set of conventions, which in turn reflect
a political theory about the appropriate function of judges,"' s7 originalism
does not, he argues, require historical "certainty,"" nor does it require the
impossible task of judging in a political, historical and cultural vacuum."lm
All originalism requires "is that judges apply the conventions inherent in
originalist theory to make their best estimate of the 'framers' intent.' "14
Maltz does not further elaborate the content of these conventions of
originalist judging,14' and indeed he frankly recognizes a need for originalists
is See supra note 13.
135 See Powell, supra note 11, at 661 (noting the Court's "notorious" misuse of
historical interpretation); see also Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
Sup. CT. REV. 119 (making the classic complaint against legal misuse of history).
136 Maltz, supra note 7, at 796; see also Maltz, supra note 25, at 813 ("Interpretive
theory demands neither perfection nor certainty .... The interpretivist asks only that
the judge make her best effort to divine the Framer's intent and then apply that intent in
the case before her as accurately and faithfully as possible.").
137 Maltz, supra note 7, at 800.
138 Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMM. 43,
52 (1987); Maltz, supra note 7, at 796.
139 Maltz, supra note 138, at 52.
140 Id.
141 While Maltz's view of originalism as a set of conventions grounded in political
theory is appealing on its own terms, one might well doubt whether the conventions of
originalist judging to which Maltz refers in fact exist. Other than its general
admonishment to follow the intentions of the founders and to remain faithful to the text,
originalism lacks a set of well-defined rules treating many of the problems inherent in
originalist historical research-for example, the questions of whose intentions should
count, and how to sum the intentions of a group of individuals. See supra notes 11-12.
Maltz argues that part of originalism's appeal is its modeling of constitutional
interpretation on the familiar principles of statutory interpretation. Maltz, supra note 7,
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to develop what he calls, following Mark Tushnet, "supplementary eviden-
tiary rules" for dealing with historical uncertainty."42 Nevertheless, for our
purposes it is clear enough that Maltz views originalism as imposing only a
fairly lenient evidentiary standard on the judicial search for the founders'
intent. If one had to translate this view into the language of off-the-shelf
judicial standards of review, one might say that originalism permits judges to
ascertain original intent according to, at most, a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, but perhaps more nearly the even less rigorous "substantial
evidence" standard familiar in administrative law. 43
Applying this standard to the hypothetical set out above, we could con-
clude that the founders did not view flogging as cruel if this conclusion rests
on substantial evidence. The same standard, however, might not necessarily
suffice to support a judicial conclusion that the people now consider flogging
to be a cruel and unusual punishment. Originalists might justifiably require
a tougher standard for judicial evaluations of the terms of current consent.
In the absence of a proposed amendment or other political event bringing an
issue to the foreground, the people are unlikely to have focused their atten-
tion on the precise question under review.'" Moreover, the existence of rati-
fying conventions permits judges to focus their historical research on a
at 788. This defense of originalism may prove problematic, however, as the principles of
statutory interpretation do not comprise a clear body of conventions. In fact, the canons
of statutory interpretation are often contradictory and puzzling in their applicability and
use. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 460-62 (1950). This
uncertainty has led to a recent explosion in the scholarship of statutory interpretation.
See Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process
Era, 48 U. Prir. L. REV. 691 (1987) (outlining an agenda for post-legal process
legislation scholarship and pedagogy). Maltz argues elsewhere for certain principles of
ascertaining legislative intent, but his arguments for these principles are normative rather
than conventional. See Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case
for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that "courts
should apply a slightly modified form of the intentionalist model").
14 Maltz, supra note 7, at 803-04; see also Maltz, supra note 25, at 834-35 (discussing
additional "conventions" to refine our conception of the Framer's intent).
143 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); see Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (substantial evidence is "something less
than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a decisionmaker's] finding from being
supported by substantial evidence"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938) (substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion").
14' It is undoubtedly the case that the founders themselves did not explicitly consider
many of the constitutional questions that come before the courts for decision.
Originalists do not appear to believe that the failure of the founders to focus their
attention on a particular problem relieves the courts of the obligation to decide the case in
accordance with the founders' intentions. See, e.g., Meese, Construing, supra note 3, at
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relatively small number of individuals politically authorized to speak for the
people. In less clearly defined circumstances, the field of politically relevant
intentions could embrace the entire populace and therefore yield less reliable
results.' 45 Because of this compounded uncertainty, updating might require
a more demanding evidentiary standard of persuasion.
Another proponent of originalism, Raoul Berger, has advocated an
approach to constitutional interpretation that might be useful in this context.
Berger argues that interpretations of the Constitution that are faithful to
deeply rooted historical attitudes-for example, the founders' attachment to
a governmental system of federalism-are entitled to a presumption of valid-
ity. 46 Any other interpretations, he claims, particularly new ones over-
throwing settled understandings, must be supported by "a clear showing" in
order to overcome this presumption.147 Berger's technique of employing
presumptions for the purpose of protecting political legitimacy may be
adaptable to the question of updating. Under this approach, originalism
may caution against undertaking the risks associated with judicial updating
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the people now hold
reflective wishes contrary to those expressed in the original terms of consent.
Such a standard might strike the proper balance between the benefits of
adjusting the Constitution to reflect current consent and the risks that the
Court will reach erroneous conclusions about the terms of current
consent.
148
Though these standards for judicial updating may seem demanding, the
Court has at times employed-or at least claimed to employ-standards for
updating that far exceed those outlined above. One of particular interest 4a
is the "unthinkable" standard of Boiling v. Sharpe.1" Boiling, a companion
case to Brown v. Board of Education,'' involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to the racially segregated public school system maintained by the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Because the District of Columbia was not a state, the
145 This is not an insurmountable difficulty. One might for example adopt a
"supplementary evidentiary rule" calling for identification of popular opinion leaders.
See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 794-96; cf. Maltz, supra note 7, at 803 (arguing that
intentions of state legislatures are relevant, but that an attempt to determine their
understanding is "likely to be hopelessly complex"; it is therefore sensible to limit inquiry
to the understanding of Congress).
146 See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY, supra note 6, at 16-17, 153-55.
147 Id. at 17.
148 Berger himself would not accept this analysis; he seems to view the founders'
intentions as authoritative for reasons other than the ones given here. See Berger,
Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 351
(1988) (arguing that judicial authority comes "[flrom the founders .... and it is confined
by their written restrictions"); see also supra note 125.
149 Professor Maltz has called Boiling v. Sharpe "the greatest challenge" to
originalism. Maltz, supra note 25, at 850.
150 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
151 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment did not apply, and the
Court's holding in Brown did not obligate the District of. Columbia to deseg-
regate its schools. Rather, the District was a federal enclave governed by the
fifth amendment's due process clause which, although it resembled the four-
teenth amendment in many respects, simply did not contain an equal protec-
tion clause.152
The absence of constitutional language suggesting an equal protection
constraint applicable to the federal government did not cause the Court any
difficulty in Bolling. The Court simply updated the original, established
meaning of the fifth amendment's "due process" language to include the
concept of equal protection; this aspect of the fifth amendment due process
clause is now commonly called its "equal protection component."'"
The Court explained its ruling in this way:
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government1 4
Of course it is anything but unthinkable that the federal government could
face a lesser set of constitutional constraints in these circumstances. The
fifth amendment was adopted at a time when the federal government was
thought destined to be weak and therefore not much of a threat,' and by a
generation that felt quite comfortable with a congeries of social and eco-
nomic inequalities that would be intolerable today.'5 Similarly, the four-
teenth amendment was adopted in the context of curbing state, not federal,
abuses; the federal government was seen as a champion requiring additional
powers, not an oppressor requiring additional restraints. 57  If it was
152 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387, 396 (1989); see also Grey,
supra note 130, at 711 (arguing that "[t]here is no textual warrant" for the Court's
decision in Boiling).
154 Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).
15 E.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 36, Nos. 45, 46, at 288-300 (J. Madison).
156 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (slavery); art. V (taxation on importation of
persons); amend. XIX (limited suffrage); amend. XXIV (poll tax); see also Steinfeld,
supra note 123 (exploring the inconsistencies of nineteenth century expansion of suffrage
with almost universal pauper exclusions).
157 For example, section five of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5, granted Congress the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment's proscription of
unequal treatment of citizens by states. This provision has turned out to be a significant
grant of power, one that gives the federal government significantly more power in this
area than the states possess. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(upholding "minority business enterprise" provision of the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977) and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding
Federal Communications Commission minority preference policies), with City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the city of Richmond's
minority set-aside program for city construction contracts).
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"unthinkable" that the Constitution could prohibit state but not federal
denials of equal protection, it was unthinkable not in relation to the original
understanding of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, but in relation to
contemporary social views concerning segregation and racial equality. The
Court then drew on these views in reaching its decision to update the text.
The Boiling unthinkability standard seems, at least on its face, quite con-
servative: the Constitution will be updated not when-it is merely possible
that the updated version will rest on a broader, sounder base of popular
consent, nor even when such a result is plausible, probable or very likely.
Rather, the Court will undertake to update the Constitution only when it is
simply unthinkable-presumably to a reasonable person familiar with
American culture and traditions, although the Court is not specific on that
point-that a requisite supermajority of contemporary society members
would not prefer, upon suitable reflection, to live under the updated version
rather than the original version.
There is undoubtedly much more that could be said about the proper stan-
dard to apply to judicial updating in light of originalism's theoretical
assumptions and goals, but it is not my purpose here to undertake an
exhaustive examination of this topic. Rather, I wish only to demonstrate
that it is possible to discuss standards for judicial updating in a way that is
both meaningful and consistent with originalism's underlying political the-
ory. Certainly nothing in the theory of consent-based positivism suggests
that the sky will fall if originalists relax their rigid resistance to judicial
updating of the constitutional text. Instead, originalist political theory itself
suggests that originalists' efforts would be better spent elaborating a flexible
theory of judicial updating that will specify when updating is appropriate
and when it is not.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been my aim in this Article to show that originalism, whatever its
underlying defects, does not succeed in justifying, on its own assumptions,
its widely heralded conclusions that courts should never update the constitu-
tional text to conform to current norms, and that the constitutional amend-
ment process is the only politically legitimate way for constitutional
updating to occur. Much of the appeal of originalism as a doctrine of consti-
tutional interpretation derives from its invocation of what is to Americans
the familiar and well-worn, though still vital, political theory of consent-
based positivism, which holds that governments "deriv[e] their just powers
from the consent of the governed."' 15 This theory serves originalism well: it
provides a justification for the intergenerational authority of the founders
and their original understanding of the meaning of the Constitution, and it
furnishes a sound and consistent theoretical basis for originalism's strong
aversion to judicial updating. Consent-based positivism, however, does not
158 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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itself support the prophylactic version of the anti-updating rule that original-
ists advocate. The originalist preference for such a rule must therefore rest
on more pragmatic reasons for preferring that the people's wishes be in writ-
ing in order to qualify for judicial enforcement. I have tried to show that
these reasons are not entirely satisfactory, and that a more flexible version of
the anti-updating rule is fully consistent not only with originalist theoretical
premises, but with originalist pragmatic concerns as well.
The benefit of this critique, I hope, is that it provides a justification for at
least some instances of nonoriginalist constitutional interpretation even
within an originalist interpretational framework. It thus provides a basis for
rejecting a strict dichotomy between originalist and nonoriginalist styles of
constitutional interpretation, a dichotomy that has often seen nonoriginalist
interpretations derided as politically illegitimate. Finally, the critique pro-
vides a basis for preserving much of what is resonant and persuasive to mod-
em judges and lawyers about originalist style and vocabulary, while at the
same time providing an internally consistent theoretical basis for departing
from the strictest forms of originalism when justice clearly demands a differ-
ent outcome than the one dictated by the original understanding.

